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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This study, which deals with the effects of the History of Colonialism and Algerian Civil War 
on the Beur Uprisings, tries to make an analysis on the French migration policies and deals 
with the problems of being a migrant in a country having a colonial past. Algeria faced 
serious problems after the independence war in the wake of the years under French colony. 
Without the fulfillment of state-building and nation-building processes, Algeria went through 
a harsh civil war. Migration to France is a consequence of the economic and political 
problems that Maghrebians went through in their homelands. In the aftermath of the migration 
process, the Diaspora Muslims in France, however, could not integrate into the system due to 
the assimilationist policies.  Migrants who could not benefit from their right of political 
representation attempt to legitimize their problems in different ways. Therefore, youth riots 
that occurred in Paris banlieues in October 2005 demonstrated that France is still feeling the 
ramifications of its colonial past. Overall, this study contends that a strong relationship exists 
between the consequences of the colonialism, Algerian Civil War and the Beur Uprisings and 
claims that those third generation riots are the legacy of history of colonialism for France.    
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ÖZET 
 
 
Sömürgecilik tarihi ve Cezayir İç Savaşı’nın Fransa’daki Beur Ayaklanmaları’na etkisini 
konu alan bu çalışma, Fransa’nın göç politikalarının analizini yapmakta ve sömürgeci 
geçmişe sahip bir ülkede göçmen olmanın sorunlarını ele almaktadır. Cezayir, siyasi, 
ekonomik ve kültürel olarak Fransa’nın vesayeti altında geçirilen yılların ardından 
bağımsızlık mücadelesiyle ciddi sorunlar yaşamıştır. Devletleşme ve milletleşme projelerini 
tam olarak tamamlayamadan iç savaşla yüz yüze gelmiştir. Fransa’ya göç, Mağriplilerin 
ülkelerinde yaşadıkları ekonomik ve siyasi problemlerin bir sonucudur.  Ancak bu göç 
neticesinde Fransa’daki diaspora Müslümanları asimilasyoncu politikalar nedeniyle sisteme 
entegre olamamışlardır. Siyasi temsil hakkından gerektiği şekilde yararlanamayan göçmenler, 
problemlerini farklı yollarla duyurma yoluna yönelmişlerdir. Dolayısıyla,  2005 yılının Ekim 
ayında Paris banliyölerinde meydana gelen gençlik ayaklanmaları Fransa’nın sömürgeciliğin 
izlerini hala silemediğini ortaya koymuştur. Sonuç olarak bu çalışma, sömürgeciliğin 
sonuçları, Cezayir İç Savaşı ve Beur Ayaklanmaları arasında çok önemli bir ilişki olduğunu 
savunmakta ve bu üçüncü jenerasyon ayaklanmalarının sömürgecilik tarihinin Fransa’ya bir 
mirası olduğunu iddia etmektedir.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The September 11, 2001 attacks paved the way for a change in world dynamics. The attacks, 
committed by a terrorist group called al-Qaeda, destroyed the World Trade Center in New 
York City. Those attacks have become a milestone in international relations. According to 
some observers, the crucial event marked the beginning of a new age. The lives of migrants 
and minorities, living in both the United States and Europe, changed as a result of the attacks. 
Before the incidents, they enjoyed the advantages of multicultural societies. Now, they must 
contend with the discriminating assimilation policies of the Western world.  
 
It is not possible to see a positive outcome stemming from 9/11, which affected the lives of 
thousands of innocent people. And it is the first pivotal pillar of the confrontation between the 
West and the Muslim world during the so-called postmodern era. Although Muslims across 
the globe condemned the attacks, al-Qaeda militants under Osama bin Laden’s leadership 
have not altered their discourse on jihad. In response, the West re-invoked the idea of 
“enemies within.”1 The West has been suspicious of minorities and migrants ever since. 
While the migrants living in the US and the Europe were dragged into a boiling bowl in the 
aftermath of the attacks on the one hand, the state administrations looked for various 
precautions on the other hand. The 2005 Beur2 incidents in France may be considered a prime 
example.  
 
Eastern migrants and the Western world came face to face during the October 2005 banlieues 
uprisings in Paris. I will elaborate the connection between the uprisings and the repercussions 
of 9/11 in detail with this study. This connection, which is demanded to be elaborated in detail 
                                               
1
 This definition was initially put forward during the Cold War era.   
2
 This concept was firstly used during the incidents occurred in France in 1980s. Although the migrant 
youngsters refused the denomination of ‘Beur’, this notion has been frequently used in the literature of 2005 
riots.  
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by this study, has reminded me Edward Said’s eternal study, Orientalism, again. As a young 
international relations graduate who was working for an international online newspaper in 
October 2005, I had chance to closely follow the Beur incidents in the Paris suburbs. I also 
gained a chance to pursue the news flow minute by minute. Therefore, the Beur Uprisings has 
been the originating point in my part to write this study. At that time, it was obvious that these 
uprisings were no accident or anomaly. This created curiosity in my part to think about the 
roots of the incidents. Undoubtedly, the 2005 uprisings carried the debate of ‘self-other’ to the 
French society once again. The Maghrebin migrants were considered as the ‘others’ and 
excluded on the one hand, and were absorbed as the ‘self’ and tried to be assimilated on the 
other hand. Moreover, that curiosity opened the gates of the history of French colonialism 
because it was not possible to separate the Beur uprisings from the history of the French 
colonialism and, later, the Algerian Civil War. All of these events, from French colonialism, 
to the Algerian Civil War, to the September 11 attacks, to the Beur uprisings, are links in a 
larger ringing chain of history that informs the backbone of this study.   
 
Aims of the Study 
 
This study aims to provide an understanding about the relationship between the French 
colonization of Northern Africa, the Algerian Civil War and the Beur Uprisings. As it has 
been mentioned before, these three topics are closely related to each other, since the former 
precipitated the latter.  In essence, this study claims that the Beur Uprisings are the 
consequence of the Colonization period and the Algerian Civil War that broke in 1991.   
 
Chapter I – titled, the Surrendering to the Aura of Colonialism and Its Consequences – will 
try to provide a general understanding of the history of colonization with an emphasis on the 
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colonization of North Africa. Moreover, Chapter I will also attempt to elaborate the 
consequences of the French colonization era in Algeria and how this era paved the way for the 
Algerian Civil War, which fed the long incubating atmosphere for the 2005 uprisings in 
France.  
 
Chapter II – titled, the Chasing the Algerian Civil War: A History of Resurrection or 
Tantalization? – will try to challenge the reader’s assumptions as to whether the civil war in 
Algerian that broke in 1991 created an environment ripe for resurrection, or affirms a history 
of tantalization. In addition, this chapter aims to analyze the road to the Algerian Civil war by 
starting with a deeper investigation about the time period immediately after Algeria’s 
independence in 1962. The Algerian Civil War remains hazy because of the domestic 
dynamics of the country at that time. However, the civil struggle was ostensibly one of the 
drivers of Algerian migration to France. At the time of the civil war, certain segments of 
Algerian society struggled to live because of political and economic marginalization. These 
struggles encouraged many Algerians to migrate to France.  
 
Chapter III – titled, the Algerian Migration to France: Legacy of the Colonial Regime – will 
try to illuminate the pre-developments of this migration to France, specifically, the handicaps 
within France that affected a larger crises in French society.  Dealing with the demographical 
influence of the Muslim origin migrants, this chapter will also challenge the policies of the 
French administration with discussions of assimilation and discrimination. Moreover, Chapter 
III will provide a theoretical background for the Beur Uprisings of October 2005 by pointing 
out those factors in French society that determined their course.  
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Methodology 
 
  
This study, which is composed of three chapters, is an explanatory one aimed at providing an 
understanding of the chain of relations regarding Colonialism, Algerian Civil War and the 
Beur Uprisings. Literature review has formed the backbone of this study. I could not use 
primary sources or records while writing the thesis, since the primary sources were out of 
reach. Furthermore, I could not benefit the oral history narratives. The reason for this is 
simple; due to the limitations of time and space, it was not possible for me to reach any first 
persons or their relatives who experienced or witnessed the events. On the other hand, I could 
not conduct an archival search, since it was not possible for me to go to France and Algeria. 
Due to these limitations, current material conditions to conduct a field research have been 
unattainable as well.   
  
Therefore, I have used secondary sources and movies as visual documents to construct the 
theoretical framework for this study.  Secondary sources were comprised of books, academic 
articles, newspaper articles and commentaries. It was difficult and took time to access and 
collect all these documents. Initially, I made a detailed literature review and formed an outline 
in order to classify the documents that I could gather. Furthermore, I paid close attention those 
sources that are directly related to the topic. It must be added that Istanbul Bilgi University 
library and the electronic journals under the structure of the library helped me to create the 
framework of the thesis. The main electronic journals which benefited this study are mainly 
the Project MUSE, Journal of African Cultural Studies and Journal of African History.  
  
Additionally, the newspapers published in 2005 have been scanned to form the background of 
the Beur Uprisings.  While all the mentioned documents formed the theoretical infrastructure 
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of the study, I used visual material as a supportive material. Mathieu Kassovitz’s film, La 
Haine, has been very illuminating while analyzing the incidents in France. I would like to use 
visual documentaries on Algeria during the civil war period and on France about the Beur 
uprisings; however, since all the documentaries were published in French, it was not possible 
to access these documentaries.   
 
State of the Art 
 
This study has helped to diversify the reading materials on three main topics: Colonialism, 
Algerian Civil War and Beur Uprisings within the context of migration. However, there are 
also some reading materials, which will be mentioned below, that address three of the topics. 
The history of colonialism has remained a hot issue, despite a decolonization process after the 
second world war that attempted to mitigate the affect of colonization. There have been 
important studies on colonialism that benefited this thesis. Raimondo Luraghi’s famous book, 
Sömürgecilik Tarihi (1975) (History of Colonialism), constituted an important component to  
Chapter I. While the author revealed the colonial past in his book, he also emphasized how 
colonial rules harmed colonized countries.  
 
Edward Said’s contribution to this study was inevitable. Without focusing on the 
understanding of “other” in terms of West towards the East, this study would remain 
incomplete. Hence, Orientalism (1999), and Culture and Imperialism (1993) have been very 
beneficial to outline the divergent understandings of the two worlds. Robert Young’s 
Postcolonialism: A Historical Introduction (2001) is another supportive material that lays out 
the significant, postcolonial discourses. Moreover, Frantz Fanon has established one of the 
main pillars in this study. All his works, Toward the African Revolution (1964), A Dying 
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Colonialism (1965), The Wretched of the Earth (1963) draw on the emotional background of 
the effects of colonialism in Algeria. For further analysis in social sciences, one may need to 
see the background of the incidents. Hence, Fanon’s teachings fulfilled this necessity.     
 
Paul Silverstain’s articles, The New Barbarians: Piracy and Terrorism on the North African 
Frontier (2005) and An Excess of Truth: Violence, Conspiracy Theorizing and the Algerian 
Civil War (2002), formulated the infrastructure of Chapter II. Silverstain’s aim was to provide 
an understanding of the Algerian Civil War by clarifying the social, political and economic 
loses. Moreover, these articles had a multidimensional purpose, since they also served to point 
out the relationship between colonialism, the civil war and the migration.  
 
Habib Suadiya, on the other hand, contributed an understanding on the deeper relations 
between the governmental elite and the military in Algeria. In Kirli Savaş (Dirty War) (2001), 
Suadiya tried to articulate the unspoken reasons for the Algerian Civil War and clarify the 
dimensions of the civil struggle. Furthermore, Ahmet İnsel’s article published in Kirli Savas 
assisted in giving an insight on the civil-military relations in Algeria. Crawford Young’s 
deliberative article composed of four reviews, Deciphering Disorder in Africa: Is Identity the 
Key (2002), also helped to support the arguments of this study.  
 
Chapter III, which basically dealt with the problems of migrants in France and the reasons for 
the Beur riots, gave an opportunity to more deeply analyse particular studies. Ayhan Kaya and 
Ferhat Kentel’s Euro-Turks study (2005) has been very helpful in providing a general 
understanding of the issue of migration in France. Moreover, it must be asserted that Kaya’s 
other work, The Beur Uprising: Poverty and Muslim Atheists in France (2005), was an 
important source for the final chapter. The aforementioned article illustrated the problems of 
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the Muslim Diaspora in France. Furthermore, the article also outlines the events that on the 
way to the Beur riots, which has helped to signal the relation between colonialism and the 
uprisings in France. Moreover, Dominique Maillard’s article, The Muslims in France and the 
French Model of Integration (2005), has also contributed to gain an insider eye to analyze the 
policies of the French government on migrants.  
 
All aforementioned studies assisted the theoretical framework for this thesis. All analysis, 
ideas and comments have been very valuable to strengthen the objectivity of the study. In this 
part, I have tried to mention the most referenced books and articles during the formulation of 
this study. Due to the time and space, all the referenced sources are not mentioned here; 
however, the utility of the other sources, which will be elaborated during the chapters, are 
needless to discuss here.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
SURRENDERING TO THE AURA OF COLONIALISM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES  
 
 
“When white men came to Africa, we had territories and they had the Bible. They taught us 
how to pray by closing our eyes. When we woke up, we saw that they had the territories and 
we had the Bible.”3 
 
 
A General Outlook to the History of Colonialism  
 
The colonization process has been the problem on five continents over the past five-hundred 
years. Many studies all around the world have provided deep historical investigations toward 
the colonizers and the colonized for many years. Before the de-colonization process that 
began before World War II, Europeans were analyzing their colonial past because of the 
limitations of their own countries and continents. Moreover, globalization and the advance of 
technology – specifically, the rise of the internet, and the improved political and economic 
conditions throughout the world – facilitated the Europeans ability to research the history of 
colonization on a global scale.   
 
 Modern human beings have used the glorious past of the Renaissance Age to defend their 
natural tendency and infirmity. This age heralded the age of colonization, a time when 
Europeans revealed the bloody past of their countries. Yet, the glorious past of European 
countries always succeeded in covering, to an extent, the evil face of colonialism. The aim of 
this chapter is to provide a general understanding of the history of colonization, with a focus 
on the colonization of the North Africa. Moreover, Chapter I will attempt to illuminate the 
                                               
3
 Raimondo Luraghi, Sömürgecilik Tarihi, trans. Halim Inal, (İstanbul: E Yayinlari, 1975), p. 1. 
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consequences of France’s colonization of Algeria, and explain how they shaped the Algerian 
Civil War.  
 
The social and political system until the end of the Middle Age was mainly based on slavery 
in countries with agrarian societies. The production was also made through manual labor and 
craftsmanship whereas the trade was based on coastal navigation. However, after the 
technological revolution of gunpowder and printing – via China and Europe during the end of 
the Middle Age -- a new social class, a modern bourgeoisie, emerged. This new class 
perceived working as a pivotal duty of humans, whereas it was previously perceived as the 
duty of slaves. Because of the absence of slave based labor, the Bourgeoisie class had to 
develop new techniques of production, such as searching for new energy resources.  
 
It is beneficial to point out some of the inventions that altered the world order through their 
influence during the colonial period. First of all, some changes were made on the bottom of 
ships to fight against the giant waves in the Atlantic Ocean. These changes paved the way for 
new discoveries. Moreover, the watch spring improved. It was used to determine the exact 
longitude of a sailboat in the ocean with the invention of the compass. Furthermore, in 1530, 
German innovator Johann Jürgen created a spinning wheel that improved the production of 
fibre -- just after the initial hand of Leonardo da Vinci. He solved the problem of the flyer and 
thread winding. Afterward, new mining techniques and the ability to operate metals in high 
thermometer ovens were developed.  
 
All aforementioned innovations caused the collapse the Middle Age craftsman. Now, a huge 
capital that the craftsmen could never imagine was needed in order to ramp-up production. 
Overwhelmed factory administrators soon became the center of production. Hence, a new 
 10 
civilization was born in Western Europe, which might be called a machinery civilization, 
because it was based on serial production and advanced techniques. Francis Bacon, an English 
Philosopher and a proponent of the scientific revolution, reflected the ideology of the new 
civilization with these words:  
 
Let’s analyze the power, effects and the consequences of the 
innovations that illuminated itself with mainly three innovations of 
which they are not known by the olds and of which their roots have 
been benighted although they belong to the near future. In other 
words, let’s analyze the innovations of printing, gunpowder and 
compass. All these innovations entirely changed the aspects and 
conditions of the world. First of them made changes in literature, 
second in the art of military and third in the navigation. Numerous 
other innovations followed these changes. We can say that these 
innovations made the effect on the humanity in such an extent that 
none of the empires or the possession could make before.4 
 
According to Raimondo Luraghi, an Italian scholar, all these innovations had been the start of 
a revolution that would rootedly change the face of the world. Europeans who were 
encouraged with the ambition of possessing gold and raw material competed with each other 
not only to improve the trade adorned with new techniques and to provide new markets but 
also to discover new territories with the ambitions of invasion. They longed to possess the 
remaining part of the world with all those ambitions. 
 
                                               
4
 Luraghi, Sömürgecilik Tarihi, p. 16.  
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Now, what remained for the Europeans is only to discover and to 
seize. Yes, seizure. Because, Europeans used to perceive their 
civilization as unique in those days. This mentality, of which many 
Europeans and Americans still have, emerged because of the 
evaluation of a nation not by moral aspects but its technical level. 
Other nations that still involved in the civilizations of agriculture and 
craftsmanship were not anything other than barbarians…They were 
barbarians, because they did not have cannons, machineries of fiber 
and guns. Those men did not even think that those civilizations they 
met were not inferior from their civilizations; however, theirs were 
only different from them…According to them, those men were only 
barbarians and deserved to be under their thumb.5 
 
Nevertheless, Robert Young draws a distinction between imperialism and colonialism by 
clarifying that colonial activities were carried out for commercial purposes, whereas 
imperialism was mostly concerned with cultural expansionism. He claimed that colonization 
included people whose primary aim was to settle anywhere, rather than ruling others. It was 
mostly associated with the notions of civilizing or missionary work in the nineteenth century. 
However, in most cases, it involved the latter as an outcome of the former. Briefly, 
colonization did not focus on transporting cultural values. That occurred as a by-product of its 
real goals concerning trade, economic exploitation and settlement. Young continues his 
argument with these words:  
 
                                               
5
 Luraghi, Sömürgecilik Tarihi, p. 17.  
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Colonization, as Europeans originally used the term, signified not the 
rule over indigenous peoples, or the extraction of their wealth, but 
primarily the transfer of communities who sought to maintain their 
allegiance to their own original culture, while seeking a better life in 
economic, religious or political terms- very similar to the situation of 
migrants today.6 
 
Modern colonialism meant to take control of people whose economy was still agriculturally 
based and whose craftsmanship used underdeveloped techniques. Those who had advanced 
techniques bore the economy. In that sense, it may be claimed that colonialism has been a 
struggle between the civilization of modern industry and another civilization whose economy 
was based on agriculture and underdeveloped craftsmanship. Henceforth, colonial 
expansionism continued using the arguments of turning the world into a more civilized and 
humanized one. On the one hand, while the colonial powers succeeded in adapting their 
advanced economic and agricultural techniques to relatively underdeveloped areas, they failed 
to notice how they caused irreparable harm to the cultures of the colonized countries. 
Moreover, colonized societies adorned with advanced techniques lost their independence, and 
were controlled and exploited by the colonial powers; and were dragged into inferiority and 
wretchedness instead of civilization and development. This quotation from Jules Harmand in 
Edward Said’s work seems quite a remarkable position on the moral aspect of colonialism:    
 
They felt a sense of superiority to others; one French proponent of 
colonialism, Jules Harmand, said: It is necessary, then, to accept as a 
principle and point of departure the fact that there is a hierarchy of 
                                               
6
 Robert Young, Postcolonialism: A Historical Introduction (USA: Blackwell, 2001), p. 20.  
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races and civilizations, and that we belong to the superior race and 
civilization…The basic legitimation of conquest over native peoples in 
the conviction of our superiority, not merely our mechanical, 
economic, and military superiority, but our moral superiority.7 
 
As one of the authorities of the postcolonial discourses Edward Said determines in his 
groundbreaking book, Orientalism, that the Orient was almost an invention peculiar to 
Europe: it was the place of hard adventures, exotic creatures, images filled with haunting 
memories and extraordinary experiences as of the antique era.8 Said adds that French and 
British colonialists, unlike the Americans, had a rooted Orientalist tradition and had a special 
compromise with the East because of Orient’s special status for the European-Western 
experience. Therefore, the East is not a neighbor for Europe; but, the region of the major 
richest and oldest colonies of the European countries. It was the source of their civilization 
and language, cultural rival and one of the deepest and mostly repeated images of the Other.9 
 
The desire of the Europeans was to create a more civilized world by carrying new inventions 
to the relatively underdeveloped countries. This was the apparent face of the colonial 
adventure. Their main difficulty was the search for gold to provide capital for the young 
European industry that was slowly advancing toward the Industrial Revolution. This 
eventually occurred during the end of the late eighteenth and into the early nineteenth 
centuries. However, by the end of the fifteenth century, Europe was deeply involved in an 
economic depression. Ardent voyagers and discoverers hoped to satisfy the European 
sovereigns by finding new resources for the wealth of their respective country. They also 
wished to satisfy their own curiosity of discovering new faces of the world. Some of the 
                                               
7
 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism. (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), p. 17. 
8
 Edward Said, Şarkiyatçılık. trans. Berna Ulner.  (İstanbul: Metis, 1999) p. 11.  
9
 Said, Şarkiyatçılık, p. 11.  
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Spanish discoverers like Francisco Pizarro (1476-1541), who was the conqueror of the Inca 
Empire, and Hernan Cortés (1485-1547), who was the conquistador of the Aztec Empire, 
were honored and rewarded with royal titles and some shares from the captured property of 
the conquered territories by the Spanish kings.  
 
Since Pizarro and Cortés have been mentioned, it would be illuminating to deal with the 
invasions of the Aztec and Inca Empires. Their invasions blackened colonial history because 
of the cultures and civilizations destroyed. As argued above, the European perception of their 
own civilization as superior and unique dragged the invaders to the abolishment of other 
advanced civilizations. The Aztec Empire, invaded by Cortés, had developed a wide range of 
systems to code digits. The system provided to the ability to make mathematical and 
astronomical calculations. This coding system – developed by their neighboring civilization, 
the Maya -- was more advanced than the system found by the Europeans, even more advanced 
than the Greek and the Roman systems. The calendar used by the Aztecs was superior to the 
contemporaneous Europe calendars.10 
 
Unfortunately, the ignorance and bigotry of the civilized Europeans razed all the findings of 
Aztec and Inca Empires. Juan de Zumárraga (1468-1548), who was the first Spanish 
archbishop of Mexico, suppressed all the books written in the Aztec language. All 
manuscripts were burned on the Tlatelolco square.11 Henceforth, the Aztec Civilization was 
entirely abolished. Those sentences by Cortés clarify the dimensions of the incidents known 
as the Tlatelolco Massacre: “They no longer had nor could find any arrows, javelins or stones 
with which to attack us, and our allies fighting with us were armed with swords and bucklers, 
and slaughtered so many of them on land and in the water that more than forty thousand were 
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killed or taken that day. So loud was the wailing of the women and children that there was not 
one man among us whose heart did not bleed at the sound...”12 
.  
Christopher Columbus (1451-1560), who is known as the pivotal actor of the colonial age and 
discoverer of America, is also defined as a navigator, colonizer and explorer in many sources. 
Columbus earmarked the historical flow. He paved the way for colonization and showed the 
exact direction, while others continued his way and traveled all around the world even until 
the Island of Cipangu and Cathay. Although others like Pizarro and Cortés conquered 
empires, he laid the foundation for the invasion and rise of Spain in the New World. Hence, 
Columbus not only provided a new world for Leon and Castilian, but also for the entire 
human race. Columbus noted these sentences in his diary about the natives of Africa during 
his voyages:  
 
They seemed so honest and generous about everything they had in 
their hand, it is not possible to believe that without seeing them. It was 
possible to demand everything belonging to them since they did not 
refuse anything. They immediately give anything the demander wanted 
and they do that with such a pleasure that you think they also gave 
their hearts at the same time.13 
 
It will be quite beneficial to touch upon an anecdote here about the following incidents after 
the departure of Columbus from the coasts of Africa in 1493. A significant group of Spanish 
voyagers remained in the newly discovered territories used any kind of violence against the 
natives on their ruthless quest for gold. They raped women and enslaved the indigenous 
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people. When the natives became impatient, they attacked the Spanish voyagers and killed all 
of them. Luraghi makes a remarkable comment here: “The red color of blood and the yellow 
of gold went hand in hand in the history of bloody colonialism from the beginning. Until the 
collapse of colonized countries, gold and blood would remain as the symbol of 
colonialism.”14 Colonizers also began to implement a new system called, ‘Encomienda’ for 
the first time in India. This system provided primarily for the invaders and the sponsors, who 
supported the voyagers economically. Due to the ‘Encomienda’ principles, the new 
landowners of the colonized territories could have the right to own slaves along with the land. 
This system spread to all the other colonies.  
 
Colonization of Africa 
 
The African continent was not perceived ultimate goal for colonization. In order to deal with 
the reasons why it was left behind, it would be beneficial to acknowledge its linkage with the 
Portuguese initiatives among the continent. Portugal officially obtained from the Pope 
Nicholas V. the grant of exclusive right of navigation, conquest, trade, fishery in all seas and 
countries which they might find between Cape Bojador and the Indies, not occupied by a 
Christian nation before 1454. Hence, the Dark Continent, Africa, opened its gates for the 
European colonizers after the discovery of Africa’s Atlantic coasts by Portuguese voyagers. 
They used these coasts to circumnavigate the Islamic-Venice bloc on their way to the spice 
route. Although the Portuguese found abundant ivory, ostrich feathers and slaves, there was 
no spice except pepper. They gained about 2,400 kilos of gold, which exceeded the 1,500 
kilos annually panned out in Europe. Furthermore, it was not possible to pan out silver in 
Africa, whereas, 59,000 kilos silver was annually panned out in Europe.15 In spite of their 
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early settlement in the African coasts, Portuguese conquistadors did not perceive the African 
continent as their ultimate goal and did not move into the interiors of the continent. Africa 
was used as a transit road to reach India.       
 
The African continent named by the ancient geographers as ‘unknown territories’ (terra 
incognitae) was still not discovered until the end of the nineteenth century. This continent, 
which was the first one discovered by the conquistadors, had been the final one that abided 
the European colonialism. The reasons why Africa had been colonized lately lie behind the 
hard geographical conditions of the continent basically. Since the African continent had an 
arid climate and immense deserts, those conditions caused the invaders’ hesitation to go 
inside the continent. European vessels held to their perception of Africa as a hindrance. And 
they left the continent to its fate since they were not aware of the fact that the African 
continent, the other coast of the Mediterranean Sea, was face to face with the European 
coasts.  
 
Although Africa did not sound very attractive for the invaders due to the lack of gold and 
silver and limited spices, the continent turned into a shiny asset for the colonialists in terms of 
the slave trade. Since the rapid eradication of the redskin natives reached dreadful dimensions 
in America, landowners faced difficulty in finding workers on the fields. Therefore, one of the 
darkest pages of the history was opened in 1501, with the transfer of the African natives to 
America: the Slave trade.16 For centuries, Europeans used to capture and transport African 
natives. They were renamed, “black ivory” and were used in America in the agricultural 
areas. Three dangerous activities that would harm the world up until today were rooted and 
carried out in three different zones in the world: Opium smuggling in China, arm traffic in 
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Japan and slave trade in Africa. Rit Nosotro summarizes the colonization of Africa and the 
start of slave trade in his comparative essay by these sentences:  
Prior to the 19th century, the rest of the world knew very little about 
Africa, the Dark Continent. What trade was transacted between 
Europeans and African traders occurred on the coast. However, 
beginning in the early 1800s, explorers began to explore the African 
interior. Many of the first European explorers in Africa were 
missionaries who felt called to minister to the pagan African tribes. 
Many of these missionaries also wanted to eradicate the poisonous 
trade that wrecked havoc on so many poor Africans, the slave trade. 
After seven centuries of being brutalized by the Arab slave traders, 
Europeans took great advantage of the existing system of blacks 
capturing blacks to feed the huge demand of large plantations in the 
Americas. So Swahili or black traders trekked throughout Africa, 
capturing blacks or buying prisoners from other native tribes to sell 
as slaves on the coast.17 
All in all, in the aftermath of the French Revolution in 1789, the system of colonization in the 
New World began to fracture. Africa, the first continent stepped on by the voyagers, was also 
the last to bear European colonialism. Colonialism began on this continent, even while it was 
collapsing in others.   
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Colonization of Algeria 
 
The colonial process in Algeria started with a very simple cause; however, it ended with very 
heavy consequences. The French Republic was having domestic problems in 1830. In Paris, 
bread prices soared as wages were cut creating rampant unemployment; some 64,000 
Parisians had no stable employment. This signified that they were dependent either on charity 
or crime. King Charles X and his minister, Prince de Polignac, were planning a revolution to 
mobilize the public and turn the country into an absolute monarchy. Alison Tarwater 
summarizes the starting point of the colonial rule in Algeria with these sentences:  
 
On April 29, 1827, the dey of Algiers made an unfortunate mistake; in 
the midst of an argument with French diplomats over the settlement of 
debts, he struck the French consul in the face with a fan. Less than 
two months later, French troops landed in Algeria, beginning the 
process of colonization that would soon give them control of the entire 
Maghreb region. France’s conquest of Algeria sparked the imperialist 
movement that continued well into the 20th century, not ending until 
after World War II.18 
 
This incident provided France with an apparent excuse to invade Algeria. Although the fan 
incident is frequently cited as the cause of France’s invasion of Algeria, the situation is 
actually much deeper and more complex. During the French Revolution, France borrowed 
large amounts of grain and money from the Jewish houses of Bacri and Busnach in Algeria.19 
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When the two houses found themselves in debt to the Dey of Algiers20, they began to pressure 
France to finally repay its debts at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Additionally, the two 
houses informed the Dey of Algiers that they would be unable to pay their debts to Algeria. 
The Dey took over negotiations at this point and began pressuring France for the money. It 
was during an argument over France’s payments that the Dey hit the French consul with a fan, 
insulted over the French King’s lack of response about the country’s debts. To the French, this 
act was a personal insult to the King. After the Dey of Algiers refused their request for an 
official apology, they attacked the city without considering the French opposition in Paris. 
Within one month, the entire country was under French occupation -- where it would stay for 
over 100 years.21 
 
The attempts of Charles X and Polignac by announcing Four Ordinances, which would annul 
the constitution and aimed to declare the absolute monarchy, precipitated the July Revolution 
in France. Charles X had to escape in the same year and Louis-Philippe d’Orléans ascended to 
the throne by giving wide constitutional guarantees. France claimed Algeria as an heir despite 
challenging domestic developments. Because Charles X left behind only feudal ruins, his 
successor, Louis-Philippe, had to grapple with problems coming from banks, and the capitalist 
interests of grand traders. As it is already known, capital owners had a great penchant for 
colonial exploration. Furthermore, the Parisian chief of police had already deployed 1,500 
Parisians to Algeria to secure the welfare of the French capital. According to him, Algerian 
society would not be civilized without France.22 
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France employed French as the official language in its colonies.  This paved the way for 
hegemony within the colonies, and cultural imperialism. Secondly, the economies and 
political life of colonized countries became dependant on France in order to be productive.  In 
economical terms, France created the Franc Zone, an economic system in African countries 
that used the CFA franc as their currency after World War II. The system was designed to 
create interdependency between France and the countries of the Maghreb so that they could 
still support each other, even after the decolonization period. In political terms, the 
governments established in the colonized countries were basically puppets, since France was 
deeply involved in the political affairs of its colonies.  
 
After the French occupation, Algerians fought against the French soldiers under the leadership 
of Emir Abdulkadir. He was the son of an Algerian dervish who knew guerilla tactics. He 
liberated a wide range of Algerian territory. Abdulkadir was attacked on 23 September 1847 
and besieged. He surrendered only after his food and ammunition ran out. Thus, the Congress 
of Berlin, held in 1878, gave France a green light to establish a protectorate in North Africa. 
The congress’ outcome was uneventful for North Africa, since it mainly focused on the 
problems in the Balkans related to the Ottoman Empire and Russia. Moreover, the Treaty of 
Bardo was signed between the French Republic and the Tunisian Bey Muhammed as-Sadiq 
on 12 May 1881. The pretext of the treaty is mentioned by these acknowledgements:  
 
A raid of Algeria by the Tunisian Kroumer tribe served as a pretext 
for French armed forces to invade Tunisia. Jules Ferry, the French 
foreign minister, managed to send a French expeditionary force of 
approximately 36,000 troops to defeat the Kroumer tribe. The French 
met little resistance from both the Kroumer tribe and from as-Sadiq. 
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Eventually, the French withdrew their forces after signing the treaty. 
However, the terms of the agreement gave France responsibility for 
the defense and foreign policy decisions of Tunisia. Henceforth, Tunis 
became a French protectorate.23 
 
The Berlin West African Conference was held in 1884-1885 under the initiative of the 
German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898). This conference enabled both big and 
small states to appease one another as they carved out their share of North African colonies 
without touching big states’ spots. According to Bismarck, Germany, having already 
completed its unification in 1870 was positioned amongst the developed European states, to 
have a large share of the colonies. As Catherine Savage Pulsipher defined, the European 
diplomats shared Africa in Berlin like a cake.24 Foreign ministers from fourteen European 
states and the United States established important guidelines for the future exploitation of the 
Dark Continent. France, Germany, Great Britain and Portugal were major actors in the 
meeting. Africans were not invited to the conference. And they had no say in their future, as it 
was determined in the Berlin Conference Document.25 
 
Decolonization Period Starting with World War I 
 
The decolonization process goes back to the atmosphere of the World War I. To understand 
the background of the decolonization period, one must know the global events that led up to 
World War I (1914-1918). Great Britain and France used the League of Nations as a 
justification to annex Syria and Palestine as colonies. When the African and the Middle 
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Eastern colonies realized this, they were despondent because they knew they would only be 
allowed to set up puppet governments, whose fingers the European states could twist.  The 
people of the colonized territories finally noticed that promises of reform were only a 
deception.     
 
During WWI, the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 established the Soviet Republic in Russia. 
The leader of the Republic, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, announced following the revolution that 
the colonized world was the guarantee of the capitalist world. In the aftermath of this 
announcement, communist initiators attempted to agitate people who were under the 
protectorate of the European countries. According to Luraghi, this policy incited turmoil in 
the colonies, and heralded the decolonization process after the World War II. The European 
countries were worried that their colonies would come under the influence of the Communist 
bloc. And they realized that they had to give up their hegemony to stop the communist 
expansion.26 
 
During the WWII, Algeria and Morocco were under the control of the US and Britain. France 
was occupied by the Nazis. Although France regained her colonies after the end of the war, 
she could no longer control them. Tunisia and Morocco declared their independence in 1956; 
however, Algeria was the only remaining French colony in the North Africa. The squabbling 
between and amongst the European countries forced them to be more dependant on the 
resources of their colonized territories. It was not possible to avoid the reflections of the grand 
war given against the Nazi and Fascist bloc to the entire world. The armed struggle against the 
Nazis in Europe had spread from Indonesian jungles to Maghrebian deserts. This was the final 
stage: The stage of the Decolonization.  
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The Bandung Conference was held in the city of Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955 and had 
twenty-nine participating countries from Africa and Asia. It had a remarkable impact on 
colonialism. The ultimate goal of the conference was to determine the methods for rescuing 
the countries that were still under colonial rule. The conference made a catalyzing impression 
on the people in colonized countries.   
 
Decolonization of Algeria 
 
The decolonization process in Algeria was intertwined with the French political life. French 
rulers tried ‘assimilate’ the country in 1871 to combat the Algerian revolt. Luraghi criticized 
this system as a French policy that was eradicating the Algerian nation.27 The system of 
assimilation had two primary pillars. First, the Algerian citizens were treated as equals to the 
European settlers. However, they were considered socially and morally inferior, especially 
when it came to official matters. Second, this system turned the French settlers of Algeria into 
gendarmes because of rulers’ racist attempts. It might be enlightening to reference Alison 
Tarwater’s article when dealing with the French policy of assimilation:  
 
France focused its power on assimilation. It attempted to create in its 
colonies the same feelings of loyalty toward France that “real” 
French people felt. Thus, France’s colonization of countries created a 
territory almost fully dependent on the French government. Algeria in 
particular is evidence of this tendency, and although Morocco and 
Tunisia were more autonomous colonies, they were relatively 
dependent on the authority of France.28 
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One might claim that the road to independence for Algeria began with the establishment of 
the North African Star (ENA) in Paris in 1919. The organization under the leadership of 
Ahmed Ben Messali Hadj (1898-1974), a former combatant, initially limited the actions of 
ENA only to Northern African workers in France until 1927. Following his critical decision to 
spread the actions to the entire Algeria in 1936, the ENA was immediately banned. In the 
aftermath, Messali founded Algerian People’s Party (PPA) in 1937. PPA was banned as well 
and Messali was put on trial for agitation, and imprisoned for several years in 1941.    
 
After World War II broke out, the right-wing Vichy government was established in France in 
1940. Many Europeans living in Algeria supported the Vichy government that showed 
cooperationist tendencies. The Allies sent troops into Algeria in 1942. To the contrary, 
General Charles de Gaulle (1890-1970) called all the Algerians to fight against Nazism and 
Fascism. De Gaulle received the expected reply from Ferhat Abbas (1899-1985), an Algerian 
political leader who was deeply influenced by the French culture. Abbas had already 
denounced an Algerian nation and agreed to cooperate with France in 1936.  In 1943, without 
altering his ideology, Abbas decided to support Algerian independence only under the roof of 
liberty.  Abbas and twenty-eight local members published the Manifesto of Algerian People in 
1943. In the manifesto, Abbas and his friends called for autonomy and a constitution prepared 
by a constitutional assembly elected by the public.29 
 
In the aftermath of these developments, France arrested Abbas; however, they had given some 
concessions and detainees were released. After his release, Abbas met with Messali, who was 
in custody in France, and with some representatives from the Algerian Ulema. In 1944, they 
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formed the Friends of the Manifesto and of Liberty (AML). The aim of this organization was 
to establish a federal Algeria based on equality under French control.  Half a million people 
joined the AML; however, the ongoing war delayed the French response. However, a series of 
skirmishes had already broken out between the French and Algerians by the end of the war. 
Luraghi contributes those days in his book: 
 
 Algerian people experienced arrestments, executions without trials 
and village bombardments from sea during this period. According to 
the data provided from the American Consulate, 40,000 Algerian were 
killed and all organizations were banned. Europeans who demanded 
Ferhat Abbas and other Algerian leaders to be executed by shooting 
recommended the need of cruel gendarme in Algerian territories.30 
 
Nevertheless, Frantz Fanon (1925-1961), whose works have inspired countries under colonial 
rule, claimed that five years of struggle brought no political change. The French authorities 
continued to proclaim Algeria to be French.31 Moreover, the French National Assembly 
approved the Organic Statute of Algeria in August 1947. This new statute provided some 
political rights for the Algerians. Moreover, it considered all Algerians to be French citizens; 
however, they were divided them into two categories: the First part consisted of half million 
French electorates who had returned from France by giving up their Muslim identity. The 
second part consisted of nine-million second class French citizen Algerians. Only half a 
million of this group had the right to vote. Each of the two categories had the right to elect 
sixty members to a local assembly; however, forty-three of the sixty members were 
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candidates of the ruling French elites. All the mentioned policies brought the French injustice 
and inequality into sharp relief, since the forty-three members were French sympathizers.32 
 
Meanwhile, Ferhat Abbas engaged in a more decisive fight against France by establishing the 
Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto (UDMA) in 1946. While the Algerian National 
Movement (MNA) demanded separation, Messali denominated his old party as the Movement 
of the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD) and aimed to replace PPA that same year. 
The MTLD had a publishing arm that only existed for a few weeks, but nevertheless 
succeeded in crystallizing many MTLD arguments. The MTLD’s publications clarified that 
despite Messali’s lowly actions predicated on racist principles, the ideological content of the 
Algerian independence movement should be clearly defined. Furthermore, published articles 
highlighted the idea that supporting Algerian nationalism because of racial prejudices or 
religious intolerance should be unconditionally rejected. The ideology of the MTLD did not 
have any relations with hostile nationalism. The MTLD also emphasized through its 
publications that the Algerian independence movement was the direct reaction of a colonized 
nation against fanatic imperialism.33 
 
The Algerian riot started in Cebel al Aurés in November 1954. The Revolutionarist Union and 
Action Committee turned into the National Salvation Front (FLN). The Algerian combatants 
who formed the Army of the National Salvation (ALN) obeyed the FLN. The French rulers 
easily suppressed the riots after banning the MTLD, which was then still not aware of recent 
incidents; however, this ban also led members of the MTLD to join the national front as well. 
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The riots that broke out in Aurés spread to other Algerian provinces like Constantine and 
Oran in 1955.34  
 
Forty-nine Algerian deputies of the National Assembly demanded absolute equality among 
the Muslim Algerians. Jacques Soustelle, Governor General of Algeria, offered a new method 
for the Algerians that would replace assimilation: Integration. For Allison Tarwater, the 
French killed more than just Algerians during the war for independence. Tarwater emphasized 
in her article that French settlers also lost many people in Algeria:  
 
However, the Algerians continued their fight against the settlers, and 
after a massacre of pieds-noirs that killed more than 3,000 French 
settlers, the majority of the French living in Algeria left the country 
and returned to France. In 1962, with the French population almost 
gone, the country was finally granted its independence, a feat which 
had taken as many as 1,000,000 lives.35 
 
The new Prime Minister Guy Mollet, who thought he would win a victory against the 
National Salvation Army, asserted in 1956 the formula of ‘truce, elections and bargaining’.36 
That policy fueled the war, and increased military intervention in French politics. As a result, 
Robert Lacoste was sent as minister to Algeria. Lacoste was definitely sent there with more 
authorization to perform oppression and coercion of any kind. Lacoste’s deployment was 
followed by the launch of two barbarous systems that paralyzed the entire world. The first one 
implemented systematic torture while the second formed concentration camps. Countless 
detainees and suspects became victims of inconceivable tortures by SSs. The foreigners’ 
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legion was already full of former SSs. Regarding all those events, numerous documents have 
been collected even in France and these documents will always remain as evidences of the 
acute pain that the people of Algeria once suffered. Fanon makes a significant remark about 
the injuries of the Algerians: 
 
Question any woman or any man anywhere on the earth’s surface and 
ask her or him if the Algerian people have not already acquired the 
right to be twenty times independent. There is no one, in 1959, apart 
from those Frenchmen who have dragged their country into this 
horrible adventure, who does not yearn to see the end of this slaughter 
and the birth of the Algerian nation.37 
 
In 1958, the National Salvation Front (FLN) formed the interim government of the Republic 
of Algeria. Ferhat Abbas, this time inclining to fight against the enemy till the end, became 
the first prime minister of that government. Even General De Gaulle’s remarks that Algerians 
had the unconditional right to vote on issues related to ‘Algeria’s necessary development’ and 
‘Algerians self-determination right’, as well as his will to ‘solve the problem consciously, 
concisely, and without any conditions’ did not prevent further strife. Not even the Algerians’ 
decision to be known as a nation. Fanon’s contribution about De Gaulle is quite worthy:  
 
Generalle de Gaulle, addressing himself to Algeria’s extremists 
recently, declared that “Papa’s Algeria is dead.” That is quite true. 
But it is not the whole truth. Big Brother’s Algeria is dead too. There 
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is a new Algeria, an Algerian nation, an Algerian government. These 
obvious facts will sooner or later have to be recognized.38 
 
On June 14, 1960, the President said, “Algeria belongs to Algerians,” and in that way, a tie 
was established with the Interim Government of the Republic of Algeria. But soldiers 
immediately reacted against that. General Challe, Jouhaud, Salan, and Zeller rebelled in April 
1961.39 However, their failure resulted in the organization of a number of officers into the 
Secret Army Organization, which later launched macabre acts of carnage, slaughter and 
looting since it knew that there was nothing else to do from that time on. That terrible 
vulgarity lasted till the French left Algeria.  
 
The war lasted for eight years. It turned everything into a blood pool and its economic costs 
were astronomical. And the French in Algeria … At the beginning, they never wanted to give 
anything. But in the end, they had to give everything they previously owned. A French 
delegation headed by Louis Joke and another delegation headed by Kerim Belkasim and 
comprised of some members of the Republic of Algeria’s Interim Government met in Evian 
on May 20, 1961. Negotiations were halted on June 13, but started again on March 7, 1962. 
Eleven days later, on March 18, both parties signed a couple of agreements that were later 
called the Evian Agreements. Finally, the independent Republic of Algeria was founded on 
July 1, 1962.  
 
It will be beneficial to make some concluding remarks for this chapter about the affects of 
Algerian independence. Algeria, which was one of the first colonies, was one of the last to 
gain independence. The rebirth of Africa due to decolonization, and the establishment of the 
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Algerian Republic in 1962, practically ended the colonial world and opened-up a restructuring 
period in Africa. A French Arabic named Jacques Berque, who specialized in the North 
African, region comments: 
 
France and Algeria? We did not intertwine for 130 years without 
being profoundly implicated in our souls and bodies. The depth of the 
French impact has far exceeded here the habitual alienations of 
colonialism, colonial exploitation, and mercantilism. A great fortune 
and misfortune. Here, being afflicted down to the marrow; hence the 
violence of this resentment, a frenzy leading to terrible adventures. 
But from there, perhaps, also originates the source of a solution that 
can only come from shared expiation.40 
 
“Nevertheless, the colonial regimes caused the major harm over North Africa and especially 
on Algeria where France tried to cause the natives forget their nationalities and impose a 
European elite class”, Luraghi says.41 However, the age of colonialism left major problems in 
its wake. It may be supported that although the French policy of colonialism ended years ago 
indeed, its effects are still evident in France and throughout the Maghreb. These problems still 
involve all humanity. It should not be considered as an exaggeration that the peace in the 
world mainly depends on the rapid and correct solutions to these problems.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
CHASING THE ALGERIAN CIVIL WAR: A HISTORY OF RESURRECTION OR  
 
TANTALIZATION? 
 
“The Civil War is not ended: I question whether any serious civil war ever does end." 
--T. S. Eliot      
 
 
Algeria: Reborn from Its Ashes  
 
 
Analysing a country’s past cannot be independent from an investigation of its present. A 
general outlook on Algeria – about its location, demography, population, borders and politics 
– will provide the reader with a better understanding of its past. Algeria, a country that faced 
two civil wars after it gained independence from colonial rule, has many peculiarities today 
that enlighten its past. Algeria has a chequered history because of its location amidst Europe, 
the Middle-East, Africa and Asia. During its long history, the country faced six different 
invasions starting with the Carthaginians, followed by the Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, 
Arab and Ottoman, before being colonized by France.  
 
The People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria is the second largest Arab-African country after 
Sudan. It is almost one-third of the size of the US continent and resides on the Mediterranean 
coast of Africa, midway between Tangier and Tunis. Algeria is also the eleventh largest 
country in the world in terms of its total surface area. The country lies opposite of Majorca. Its 
territorial characteristic runs a gamut between the mountainous, fertile terrain of the north and 
the great area of arid desert in the south. Ninety percent of the population lives on the fertile 
coastal strip that extends about 50 miles inland and stretches about 950 miles from Morocco 
in the west, to Tunisia in the east. The cities of Algiers, Oran and Annaba, are situated in this 
area along the coast. The rugged hills and mountains of the Kabylie and the Aures rise to the 
south of the coastal plain. A high plateau, which is semiarid, lies behind the mountains. 
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Moreover, about 200 miles inland, is the vast Sahara Desert, which accounts for almost ninety 
percent of the country.  
 
Algeria, is dominated by a young population – just like the other North African countries. It 
has one of the world’s largest population growth rates at 1.88 percent. According to recent 
census data, the population has climbed to over thirty-two million. One third of it is thought to 
be under the age of fifteen while seventy-five percent is under the age of forty.42 The Algerian 
population is mostly composed of the indigenous ‘Berber’ or ‘Amazigh’ people, who 
constitute ninety-seven percent of its population. The presence of the Amazigh culture can be 
traced back to 4000 B.C.E. Moreover, about 45,000 Roman Catholics and 350,000 Protestant 
Christians, along with some 500 Jews, shape the minority groups in the country. According to 
the 1996 Constitution, Algeria is defined as an Islamic, Arab and Amazigh Country.43 
Although, it will be illuminated in the “civil war” title, acknowledgments about the role of 
demography in this part will be noteworthy. Paul A. Silverstain makes a determination on this 
role in his article, The New Barbarians:   
 
Berberophones in Algeria likewise constitute themselves as occupying a 
frontier zone. Kabylia in particular, with its vertiginous mountains, has a 
long and self-conscious history of resistance to the authority of the center. It 
was the last region to be pacified by French colonial forces and the site of 
important rebellions and fierce fighting through the long period of 
decolonization. Since independence, Kabyle men have repeatedly engaged 
in violent battles with state forces, in 1963, April 1980, July 1998, and most 
recently in April 2001. Such opposition politics translates into not only a 
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social movement for linguistic rights but also a significant third pole in the 
Algerian civil war, with Kabyle villages arming themselves in “self-
defense” militias under the control of political parties and regional 
associations.44 
 
Furthermore, Algeria can be classified as a middle-income country with an annual per-capital 
income of $2,031. Unemployment is roughly thirty percent, seventy-five percent of which is 
below the age of thirty. The civil war occurred between 1991-2002 and effectively bull-dozed 
the country, which now needs two million new houses. Many of the existing ones are claimed 
to be out of use. Anthony McGee claims in his article, Algeria, that the country has made 
progress under the rule of President Bouteflika. He also emphasizes that because of improved 
security, the country has become more attractive to international investment. Furthermore, its 
attempts to modernize its financial markets through the creation of secondary credit markets, 
has met with some success.45  
 
Pre-Civil War Period (1962-1991) 
 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Algeria declared its independence in 1962. There was a 
war for independence that occurred between 1954 and 1962. The success of the reconstruction 
period in the aftermath of the war of independence, which sought to build the state, is still 
debated.  However, the prior to the Civil War, many incidents occurred that paved the way for 
the Civil War that broke out in 1991. During this transition period, Ahmed Ben Bella, the 
leader of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) which assumed power upon independence, 
became the first Prime Minister of the country. Ben Bella, however, was later removed by 
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Colonel Honari Boumedianne. During this time, Algeria was led by a military regime until 
Boumedianne’s death in 1978. Subsequently, a civilian government was established in 1978. 
After this power change, the military’s control became more subtle. Civilians began to take up 
significant posts such as that of President. However, filling these posts was always at the 
military’s behest.46 
 
A British security journal published by the Royal United Services Institution (RUSI) listed the 
reasons of corrosion in Algerian society, along with those in Egypt; and chronicled the rise of 
Islamic extremism that precipitated the civil war. This list repudiated the arguments of those 
who pointed at religious extremism as the pivotal reason for the civil war. Instead, it pointed 
to economic factors:   
 
In both Egypt and Algeria the rise of militant Islam is symptomatic of a 
crisis of identity and loss of direction echoed across the Arab world. The 
cause of Arab nationalism, used by governments to galvanize popular 
support in the post-colonial age has failed to achieve its goals. Socialist 
economic programs, followed by faltering attempts at liberalization, have 
not succeeded in stemming the tide of growing unemployment and 
impoverishment in the face of rapid population growth.47 
 
The ruling Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) was meaningless for the young urban 
generation in Algeria. That’s because they were the malcontents of the slogans of the national 
liberation and socialist revolution during those days. The October 1988 uprisings were the 
first volley of incidents against the regime. And it was violently suppressed. In the aftermath 
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of these uprisings, the FIS emerged as the most potent rival to the FLN and won a surprising 
success in the 1990 local elections. Along with the local success, the FIS declared a triumph 
during the parliamentary elections in January 1992; however, the military-civilian 
intervention did not allow for a second ballot of the elections. So the military-civilian 
intervention prevented an Islamist regime to take root. Graham E. Fuller makes a remarkable 
contribution in his book, Algeria: The Next Fundamentalist State? on the regime discussions:   
 
Several concerns were prominent in this context, but so far none has 
developed to the extent many analysts feared. The first and overarching 
concern was the possibility of a government collapse and the advent of an 
Islamic regime in Algiers. In retrospect, this scenario seems far-fetched, but 
in the early 1990s, against a background of active Islamist movements 
elsewhere, the potential for Algeria to become the “next fundamentalist 
state” was taken seriously in many quarters.48 
 
Shortly after the military intervention, civil war broke out. More than a hundred thousand 
people died, according to official estimations. It will be beneficial to mention the attitude of 
the Western countries toward domestic events in Algerian. At the beginning of the crisis, 
Western policy toward Algeria was one of containment rather than intervention. Algiers had 
already been forcefully opposed to any role of outside actors in Algeria’s internal affairs, 
whether by governments, the European Union, or any nongovernmental organizations, Ian 
Lesser claimed.49 Hence, Algeria, reborn from its ashes in the aftermath of the country’s 
decolonization, fell into the trap of civil war in the 1990s.  
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Algerian Civil War: A Civil War or a Deep State Struggle? 
 
 
In every war, whether it is a civil war or not, there are at least two parties fighting with each 
other, and ultimately, a loser. Habib Suadiya, who was an army officer in Algeria, wrote 
sincerely about the two parties of the Algerian Civil War in his memoir, La Sale Guerre 
(Dirty War): “This was not a simple fight between the “good” soldiers who came to rescue 
democracy and “bad” Islamist terrorists who were decisive to eradicate democracy.”50 The 
loser of this war was the Algerians. For Suadiya, Algeria was not a country that had an army; 
to the contrary, the army was the one that had a country: Algeria.51 
 
The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won local elections in 1990 after the single party regime 
collapsed in 1988. The 1990 elections were a turning point for the outbreak of the civil war in 
Algeria. In January 1992, the FIS swept the first ballot of parliamentary elections by winning 
188 seats out of 231.  However, the military-civilian junta abolished the elections and 
declared martial law in February 1992. Because of the military-civilian intervention, more 
than one hundred thousand people died in conflict, massacres and assassinations. Thousands 
of people were lost and many of them were tortured. Algeria was dragged into chaos. The 
causes of the Algerian Civil War primarily have two dimensions. Under the general topic of 
civil war, the notion of civil war, and the details of its consequences on the interior struggle in 
Algeria, will be discussed. Moreover, the economic and religious dimensions of the Algerian 
Civil War will be examined under the following sub topics. 
 
It can be claimed that the surge of independence in the North African countries paralyzed its 
economies and patrimonial autocracies that subsequently faced bankruptcy and political 
illegitimacy. At the beginning of the 1990s, a continental tide of apparent democratic 
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awakening and economic reform raised hopes, briefly, of an African resurrection.52 On the 
other hand, during the 1980s and 1990s, more than a quarter of the African states that faced 
armed struggles were engaged in civil wars. First, the economic factors of these insurgences 
can be listed as falling oil revenues and rising unemployment; second, political factors 
consisted of power struggles between the military and elite classes; third, an identity crisis, 
stemming from cultural and religious factors, created divergent understandings of Islamic 
jihad that occurred within Algerian communities. All the aforementioned factors will provide 
a general understanding of the roots of the civil war, along with the factors that sustained it.    
 
Although some scholars interpreted the state’s weakness as an outcome of colonial polity, 
other scholars perceived the conditions as a resurgence of older modes of political practice. 
According to Crawford Young, these earlier works offered many productive insights to 
explain the full implications of the prolonged state crisis; however, they were still far from 
making determinations for further inquiries to enlighten the endemic civil war.53 For Zaki 
Ergas, “Others attributed the striking state deflation to the scope of the hegemonic 
pretensions of the postcolonial state, which incorporated and expanded the legacy of its 
colonial predecessor by pushing political monopoly and command economy far beyond the 
bounds of sustainability.”54 In that sense, Young makes a remarkable contribution here by 
criticizing the past political or economic elaborations. These previous elaborations only 
partially explained the state crises and civil disorder. That’s because they failed to provide a 
dimension of ethnicity, race and religion. They should have included a multidimensional 
perspective by emphasizing the importance of cultural diversity among the Algerian society 
with a comparative analysis of ethnicity, race and religion.55  
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The disintegration of existing armies in North Africa after decolonization was another factor 
that eased tensions within the countries, especially in Algeria. The dissident militias of the 
disintegrated armies, along with reservoirs of the emergent unemployed that had no 
marketable skills other than soldiering, were the ready communes to take a part in the civil 
war. Unemployed soldiers combined with former military officers; and together, they became 
actors in Algeria’s civil war. Some of those former officers had been educated in the finest 
military institutions of France, Britain, and the United States. They brought sophisticated 
warfare knowledge to insurgent groups. Moreover, fighters from the guerrilla war against the 
Soviet occupation in Afghanistan were another significant source of military experience and 
skills. Indeed, the international militias of jihad fighters included a number of Africans and 
Afghans. They had an important role in the Algerian armed insurrection. The aim of this 
chapter is not to deal with the massacres and number of deaths in the civil war.56 The main 
focus will be on discussing the political and economic consequences of the civil war. Hence, 
the contributions of Ahmet Insel, a Turkish scholar, will enlighten the essence of the civil 
war, apparently a deep state plot: 
 
There was concrete information from different sources about an existing 
junta composed of high ranking and retired generals and its domestic 
hierarchy by the middle of 1990’s. A “band” had filled the gap of FLN that 
virtually collapsed at the middle of 1980. The emerged scene was awesome. 
A band in the Algerian army composed of high ranking officers was 
inspecting oil and gas exports of Algeria behind the policy of the “uprooting 
Islamists” and seizing some of the income and gaining a systematic 
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commission from the entire import. All the income was collected in a wide 
pool and was being shared.57 
 
While thousands of Algerian youngsters joined the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the 
armed wing of the FIS, many others joined the armed groups in the suburban areas. The 
youths that joined these groups sought to escape the violence of the private military corps that 
were established in 1993. These private corps were bound to the Head of the General Staff, 
Mohammed Lamari. The private forces had 15,000 members to start and reached 60,000 by 
1995. The private forces began a so-called “cylinder operation” to the districts that voted for 
FIS in the final elections. Insel explains the army’s goal for the operation with those words:  
 
The official aim was to destroy the relations of the armed groups and the 
suburban districts who harshly opposed the government for thirty years by 
terrorizing them. Any kind of method was used to do so: collecting men from 
the streets, dynamiting houses, targeted murders, shootings in the mosque 
exits, secret arrestments, lost men or showy massive arrestments and 
unbelievable smashed bodies dynamited after beheaded.58  
 
 
Describing the violence as a struggle between the Muslim insurgents and the Algerian 
government is simplistic, if not highly dubious. That’s because the violence in Algeria 
became more divergent and less political over time -- observers of the Algerian struggle 
emphasized that the essence of this violence changed significantly over time. The violence 
that rapidly escalated after the cancellation of the 1992 elections was an insurgent dominated 
struggle, led by urban terrorism that sought to defeat the secular regime and establish an 
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Islamic state. For Lesser, the violence has turned into a more personalized and chaotic one, 
driven by vendettas, family and village rivalries, factional struggles on all sides, and 
economic opportunism:  
 
The Algerian conflict, like many civil wars elsewhere, has produced an 
entrenched war economy, bolstering diverse interests in a continuation of 
the violence. In short, the violence has become privatized and increasingly 
anarchic, and this newer manifestation of Algeria’s turmoil coexists 
alongside hardened remnants of the Islamic insurgency. The current 
violence may not threaten the survival of the military backed regime, but it 
may prove even more intractable and less amenable to political solutions 
than in earlier phases of the crisis.59 
 
When it comes to the political arena of the country during the civil war, one should 
acknowledge that the suspicious assassination of the President Mohammed Budiaf in June 
1992 offers a notable revelation about the political situation. After two transitional years, the 
Algerian army appointed Liamine Zeroual for presidency; however, the violence increased 
because of the new president’s policies. According to some scholars, massive destruction 
followed any kind of dialogue experience between the government and FIS. The most 
destructive three attacks occurred in succession in autumn, 1997. According to Insel, the 
aforementioned three massacres sent many political messages:  
 
These were the messages of the Algerian army: To give the President 
Zeroual the message that the restructuring the political era by establishing 
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a direct dialogue with the FIS leaders was not his duty; to remind the FIS 
and other Islamic organizations that they have to accept their conditions 
without any exception if they demand to end the terrorist activities including 
their followers and sympathizers; to mention the Algerian public that they 
do not have any choice other than to be subjected to the decision makers in 
this massive bloody wildness hysteria; and to show to the international 
public opinion that they are the only ones who can oppose the Islamic 
barbarism by showing its dimensions once more, although their hands are 
dirty as well.60  
 
The resignation of Zeroual was arguably the first step toward the end of the civil war. After 
his resignation, Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected in February 1999. It can be claimed that the 
amnesty efforts by the President Bouteflika in September 1999 were put into affect partly to 
end domestic fighting; however, international observers began to doubt Bouteflika 
government’s ability to implement new strategies that would end the struggle. Moreover, at a 
major international conference, President Bouteflika interrupted a questioner who figured the 
number of the victims at sixty thousand by insisting that the correct figure was at least one 
hundred thousand.61 Rather than showing the outspoken personality of Bouteflika, this 
anecdote was evidence of the Algerian government’s infirmity to quell the ongoing violence. 
The resignation of government members in 2000 and increasing violence during the holy 
month, Ramadan, were other factors that precipitated these concerns. On the other hand, 
according to official numbers, 98.6 percent in favor of Bouteflika's peace initiative, giving 
amnesty for Islamist fighters. Nevertheless, the FIS disbanded its armed faction, and a 
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majority of its militants surrendered in a government amnesty program in 2000. The GIA was 
largely defeated in 2002, although the organization continues with a small group.  
 
 
Role of Economy during the Civil War 
 
 
Economic factors made positive and negative contributions to the civil war. The role of 
economics had three pillars during 80’s and 90’s. First, it enabled an economic machine 
necessary to provide the equipment and machinery to wage a civil war. Second, it provided a 
crucial role for an international actor, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to intervene. 
Third, it heralded the emergence of Algeria’s energy resources into the markets of Western 
countries.   
 
The Algerian war machine provided itself, and neighboring countries, with armaments during 
the civil war years. Young claims that the expansion of black markets in weaponry was 
essential to the expansion of armed conflict.62 Lenient security measures eased the 
establishment of the black markets and accelerated the armament process in the country. 
Moreover, while some GIA groups had financial support from peri-urban communes, rural, 
local traders, on the other hand, were able to finance their own operations. By the end of the 
1990’s, however, GIA assassinations devolved into haphazard operations. This opened the 
way for repressive security forces to have greater affect. Therefore, GIA forces had to finance 
themselves through criminal activities like the dug trade and stolen cars.63 Actually, the 
inclusion of the Moroccan factor will be beneficial here. “Some quarters also claimed that 
Moroccan leadership facilitated the infiltration of insurgents and weapons along the border. 
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Wariness and competition with Morocco is likely to be a hallmark of revived Algerian 
diplomacy and a focus of the country’s security planning,” Lesser claims.64 
 
The IMF played a crucial role in the Algerian economy. The international fund not only 
dilapidated the understanding of a foreign intervention as an economic solution, it also played 
a key role to end the civil war. Jacques Derrida’s evaluation is quite remarkable: “With 
respect to Algeria’s foreign debt and what is linked to it, the matter is that unemployment, 
despair, dramatically increased poverty are the essential components of the civil war and all 
of today’s sufferings.”65 To understand the effect of the IMF, one should know about 
Algeria’s economic situation during that time. The 1980’s had been a decade of stagnation 
and escalating debt. By 1992, Algeria’s total debt had reached $26 billion, requiring anywhere 
from $8 billion to $12 billion of state revenue to service.66 The fiscal crisis circumscribed the 
capacity of the state to respond to the Islamist uprising militarily. Members of the FIS 
anticipated the Algerian government’s imminent collapse. However, the salvation of the 
economic crisis came from a startling source, the IMF. Young summarizes the Algerian-IMF 
relations and its involvement in the process:   
 
The structural adjustment program the IMF provided the government in 
1993 brought debt relief and, by 1995, the resources necessary to redouble 
army counter insurgency capacities, to greatly enlarge its ranks, and to 
construct a repressive network that first contained then gradually 
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circumscribed the Islamist guerrillas, mostly limiting them to a few 
mountain and high plateau zones.67  
 
As noted earlier, the IMF’s adjustment program facilitated an end to the civil war. That’s 
because it provided the needed financial asset for the Algerian army. The AIS, the Armed 
Wing of the Principle Islamist Group, had to end armed combat in 1999 and announced an 
amnesty for its six thousand members. Moreover, the GIA and GSPC, The Salafist Group for 
Prayer and Combat, pursued rare activities in the aftermath. The army, enriched with new 
economic drift, killed GIA leader Antar Zouabri in February 2002 and about fifteen hundred 
and three thousand were almost disintegrated.  
 
By making a comparison between Algerian politics and economics, Lesser advocates that the 
civil war affected Algeria’s economy in a positive way and provided an attractive zone for 
foreign investment: 
 
If Algeria’s politics remain highly unsettled, the Algerian economy is in a 
healthier position…First, high prices for oil and gas have bolstered 
revenues in an economy overwhelmingly dependent on hydrocarbon 
exports….As noted earlier, energy production and exports remained 
relatively unaffected by Algeria’s violence. In fact, foreign investors proved 
willing to undertake new projects even during the height of the Algerian 
crisis. Second, today’s somewhat more stable internal situation is beginning 
to encourage new investment from Europe and the United States outside the 
energy sector.68  
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Moreover, the ideas of Martinez -- a pseudonym for a scholar of Algerian ancestry who 
settled in France -- concurs with Lesser’s arguments. Martinez, whose richly detailed book is 
based upon extensive interviews with participants in the Algerian civil war, especially 
members of the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA), makes a correlation between the jihadist 
understanding and economics. “The practice of jihad, whether for corsairs or Islamist 
terrorists, is a lucrative economic activity,” Martinez claims.69 He also concludes that the 
civil war fed some groups who wanted to gain an advantage: “War is, to the protagonists, a 
virtuous way of accumulating wealth and prestige and that, in that sense, the consolidation of 
violence is the result of the opportunities for social advancement which it creates.”70 
Nevertheless, Silverstain adds: “The economic liberalization and structural adjustment 
policies imposed on Algeria in 1994 as part of the IMF’s rescheduling of debt repayment, 
rather than undercutting the maquis’ popular base, provided new economic opportunities for 
the “emirs” (as well as local notables), whose accumulated capital allowed them to enter 
newly privatized spaces (import-export, trabendo, shipping) and thus expand their local 
authority.”71  
 
Role of Religion during the Civil War 
 
 
Religious fundamentalism, as perceived in the West, reached its peak with the September 11 
attacks because the al-Qaeda militants declared that they committed the attacks in the name of 
God.  Although this declaration was condemned in most of the Muslim quarters and societies, 
its root goes back to the role of religion in the history of the North African and Middle 
Eastern countries. Michael G. Schatzberg points to the role of religion and politics in his 
article: “Most middle Africans understand that “politics” and “religion” are parts of the 
same terrain, that power flows between the visible material world and the invisible spiritual 
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world, and that the political kingdom contains a politically significant spiritual terrain.”72 
Nevertheless, this topic will not go into the details of the role of religion in the North African 
countries, since it would detract from the topic at hand. However, one should know that the 
role of religion during the Algerian civil war must not be underestimated.  
 
Retrospectively, Islam played a significant role in mobilizing opposition against French 
colonialism in Algeria. A number of presidents enjoyed close relations with key Islamic 
organizations in the aftermath of declared independence in 1962. Ben Bella, for instance, had 
spoken of Islamic socialism; however, while the state was forming in the 1970s and 1980s, 
the existing Algerian regime found that Islam could be an equally powerful tool in uniting 
support for its causes. One claim is that the Algerian urban youth, whose curriculum was 
saturated with Arab influences, had limited access to the public bureaucracy. Their perception 
of Islamism as an outcome of their Arabization would pave the way for their social ascent, 
ultimately resulting in the recognition of their social and political importance. Nevertheless, 
the readiness of those numerous unemployed young men for the protest is quite 
understandable. For them, the protest meant a call for employment and recognition. Young 
criticizes the Martinez school of analysis: “In the Martinez analysis Islam figures more as an 
idiom of protest than as an irrepressible surge of religiosity. The three million FIS votes were 
not necessarily endorsements of Islamism, nor were the thousands who enlisted as guerrilla 
fighters beginning in 1992 all motivated by jihadism.”73  
 
Furthermore, in the 1990s, the electoral support for the FIS inspired doubts about the FLN 
regime; the FIS leaders were religious activists. Young determines that the FIS elite was in 
touch with the currents of radical Islamic thought; however, details about the FIS’ theological 
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orientation and internal debates are still hazy.74 Islamism was used as discourse by armed 
organizations, like the GIA and the AIS (Armée Islamique de Salute) -- the armed wing of the 
FIS. For the FIS, the overthrow of a corrupt and faithless regime was a valid ideological 
motivator to increase commitments to jihad and establish an Islamic state. However, for some 
of the groups -- and especially GIA combatants -- worldly interests overcame the Islamic 
ideology in their mind. All in all, participants of the Algerian civil war had different 
motivations. Religion was one of them. It could be a decisive factor for a minority.  However, 
Young claimed that the Islamist order was the source of an unknowable threat, and advanced 
the cause to back the regime as a lesser evil.75 
 
Foreign Policy in Algeria during the Civil War Years 
 
Two pillars shaped Algeria’s foreign policy during the civil war years. The first pillar 
consisted of Algeria’s relationships with other countries in the North African region, the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East. The second pillar was composed of its relationship with 
Western countries. This part of the study will address the affect of Algeria’s participation in 
the Organization of the African Unity (OAU), the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as other 
regional developments that influenced Algerian diplomacy during the civil war years. NATO 
and the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Barcelona Process and Algerian-French and Algerian-
American relations will be the topics to be dealt with in the second pillar.   
 
Algeria could have been a leading power in Africa, the Mediterranean and the Middle East 
today if violence and instability had not isolated the country; however, while analyzing the 
Algerian foreign policy during the civil war period, developments in its neighboring countries 
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should not be overlooked. Hence, the Algerian Civil War should not be perceived as 
independent from regional events. In the immediate aftermath of Algeria declaring its 
independence, the establishment of the Organization of the African Unity (OAU) in 1963 
provided hope for African countries who were seeking solidarity within the region. The OAU 
had two primary aims: To promote unity and solidarity among the African states, and act as a 
collective voice for the African continent. Although the organization was established with the 
admission of fifty-three states (These are some of the countries: Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Léopoldville), Dahomey, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, The Sudan, 
Tanganyika, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, Zanzibar) in its very first year, this paper 
will address the significant incidents that ultimately derailed the OAU from its mission.   
 
First of all, the 1979 events in Uganda were a prelude to a significant new pattern. That 
pattern was the destruction of a regime by insurgents from its rural periphery, or infiltration 
from another country. In Uganda’s case, the infiltration came from Tanzania. The same year 
of the Tanzanian incursion, Uganda would retaliate with a military incursion into Tanzania. 
Similar incidents occurred in Chad and Liberia in 1990, Ethiopia and Somalia 1991, Somalia 
1991, and Rwanda in 1994. Moreover, seven African armies had intervened in the Congo-
Kinshasa Civil War in 1998.  
 
The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), established in the 1950s, was another factor that 
contributed to the formation of Algeria’s international relations. Fidel Castro had announced 
the ultimate purpose of NAM in his famous speech that was added to the Havana Declaration 
in 1979: To ensure the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of 
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non-aligned countries in their struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, 
racism, Zionism, and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, interference or 
hegemony as well as against great power and bloc politics.76  
 
It can be claimed that the foreign policy outlook of the Algerian political elite was formed by 
the struggle against French rule during the war of independence, an attachment to Arab 
socialism during the pre-civil war period, and the country’s experience on the periphery of the 
Cold War during the civil war years. Lesser makes an analysis of Algeria’s role within NAM 
by highlighting the years when Algeria’s civil war coincided with the Cold War: “Algiers, 
with Egypt, Yugoslavia, India, and others, was a founder of the Non-Aligned Movement that 
dominated developing world discourse on international politics in the 1970s and well into the 
1980s. The fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, and the end of the Cold War coincided roughly with Algeria’s descent into turmoil at 
the start of the 1990s.”77 The author, on the other hand, points to NAM’s function as mediator 
between the South and the North. Moreover, his determinations about how Algeria positioned 
itself within the surge of globalization are quite remarkable: 
 
The Non-Aligned Movement itself has reshaped its agenda to focus on the 
interests of the developing South in its relations with an increasingly rich 
North. President Bouteflika with his experience and interest in foreign 
policy—he is a former foreign minister—has emerged as a leading 
champion of this Southern agenda. He has been especially eloquent in 
addressing the threats posed by globalization to the have nots in the 
international system and the perceived exploitation of the South by 
international financial institutions and corporations. To the extent that an 
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antiglobalization backlash becomes an even more prominent feature of 
international diplomacy, Algeria is likely to be at the forefront. As part of its 
reintegration into international affairs, Algeria is likely to pursue several 
special interests beyond North-South themes. Algeria has its own regional 
security concerns, many seen through the lens of the country’s internal 
security problems. From the start of the crisis, Algiers stressed the role of 
Iranian, Sudanese, and Afghan volunteers and other external actors in 
fomenting and sustaining the violence in Algeria.78  
 
As noted earlier, contemporary politics in North Africa had been inseparable from the events 
and processes occurring across the Mediterranean during the civil war years. Therefore, to 
propose that Algeria naturally claimed a role for itself in the Middle East peace process 
through the end of 1990s will not be a faulty discourse. Following the inconclusive July 2000 
Camp David Summit, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat held conferences in Algiers that 
endeavored to involve Algerian diplomacy on security initiatives not only in the 
Mediterranean, but also in the larger Arab world.  
 
The second pillar of the Algerian foreign policy consists of its relationship with the West. 
This process can be summarized under three topics previously mentioned: the NATO- 
Mediterranean Dialogue process, the Barcelona Process with the European Union (EU) and 
relations with France and the US. It will be beneficial to emphasize that many Western 
scholars defined Western policy toward Algeria as containment during the civil war: “Western 
policy toward Algeria will need to evolve from an unspoken policy of containment toward 
reintegration and engagement.”79 
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Algeria decided to play a more active role in international affairs by the end of 90’s. 
Admission to NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue in 2000 was one result of these initiatives. 
The dialogue aimed to provide confidence and enhance regional security in the Mediterranean 
for non-NATO members. Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia have also 
participated in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue. Algeria was criticized by some regional 
countries for strengthening its hand in the Mediterranean by having a more active role in such 
security cooperation.   
 
Moreover, Algeria’s involvement in the Barcelona Process also influenced Algerian foreign 
policy at that time. Algeria could not refrain from engaging in affairs with the European 
Union (EU). The French mentality had been stamped into the country from years of 
colonization. The Barcelona Process, of which Algeria is one of 12 Mediterranean partners, 
has been a link between the 27 Euro-Mediterranean states. Its goals are to work toward 
political and security partnerships, and to develop socio-cultural and human partnerships. In a 
way, the Mediterranean Partnership, the so-called Barcelona Process launched in 1995, had 
been a bridge through the EU. For Lesser, the Barcelona Process had been a win-win process. 
The results of the Barcelona process enabled Algeria to enhance its cooperation with the EU, 
and for the EU to buttress Algeria’s security, and contain its instability: “Developments in 
Algeria in the early years of the 1990s gave new impetus to a variety of Mediterranean 
initiatives and inspired some new arrangements. Arguably, the development of a more 
concerted EU policy toward nonmember Mediterranean states was a direct response to fears 
about instability in Algeria and its regional consequences.”80 
 
                                               
80
 Lesser, “Policy toward Algeria after a Decade of Isolation,” p. 11.  
 53 
To deliver a final assessment about the aim of European countries on the process will be valid 
here. As noted earlier, the Barcelona Process mutually benefited Algeria and the EU. Through 
investing in Algeria’s economic development, the EU aimed to prevent the rise of new crises 
along its southern periphery. Moreover, for the European states, especially France, the 
Barcelona Process augmented the risks posed by Algeria to a risk posed for the EU. 
Therefore, it can be claimed that the Algerian Civil War – which created a perception of risk 
for the EU, and encouraged a passive response from other countries – led directly to the 
NATO initiative for the Mediterranean Dialogue and the EU’s Barcelona Process.  
 
This paper will elaborate Algeria’s relationship with France and the USA simultaneously. 
That’s because Algeria was ostensibly the setting for a rivalry between the two nations after 
Algeria gained its independence. Some scholars insist on the myth of a French-American 
competition in Algeria. In 1962, in the immediate aftermath of Algerian independence, 
relations with France remained ambivalent and complex. Algerian society continued to be 
attached to France via language and culture. Furthermore, Silverstain perceives this socio-
cultural attachment as a positive stance in terms of economy: “This disavowal of the 
Mediterranean did not imply the erection of ironclad physical and ideological borders 
between France and North Africa. While dependent commercially and financially on 
European Union (EU) member states as a whole, North African states have retained special 
trade ties to their ex-metropole.”81  
 
While Algeria held to its anti-colonial attitudes with regard to France, French criticism of 
Algiers increased significantly in the aftermath of the GIA hijacking of an Air France jet in 
December 1994. An escalation of hostility between the two countries was averted since the 
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hijackers’ plan was unsuccessful. Despite the civil war’s negative atmosphere, France and 
Algeria still held strong ties. President Bouteflika’s visit to France underlined a new 
development in diplomatic relations between the two countries in 2000. Although the 
cooperation was mostly held in economic and non-governmental relations, both countries 
remained sensitive because of the politics of their historical relationship.   
 
Algeria’s attitude toward the USA was markedly different. The Algerian public had a positive 
opinion of the USA’s influence because of the Kennedy administration’s support during 
Algeria’s struggle for independence. The Algerians had not forgotten Senator John F. 
Kennedy’s call for the recognition of Algeria’s right to independence. He had been the first 
international statesmen to make such speech in 1958.  The USA described Algeria as a 
“pivotal Middle Eastern, African and Mediterranean state”.82 A strategic rationale for closer 
American relations existed. Algeria is an attractive country not only for the US and France, 
but for Spain, Portugal and Italy in terms of the latter’s increasing reliance on natural gas 
resources and energy security. Although the United States perceives Algeria as the backyard 
of France, it is obvious that the US is deeply interested in Algerian affairs over all. That’s 
because developments in Algeria can impact European security and become an important 
matter on the USA’s list of topics with its European partners, especially France. Lesser’s 
ruminations offer a clue for future suggestions in terms of the perception of Algerian foreign 
policy by the Western countries:  
 
Recognizing the strength of Algerian nationalism and resistance to outside 
intervention, the West should still make clear that a full transformation of 
Algeria’s political and economic relationships will be difficult or impossible 
                                               
82
 Lesser, “Policy toward Algeria after a Decade of Isolation,” p. 19.  
 55 
without progress toward democratization and reform of a statist economy… 
The United States and Europe should make clear to Algiers that the 
development or transfer of nuclear and ballistic missile technology is 
incompatible with Algeria’s membership in NATO’s Mediterranean 
Dialogue and closer security cooperation with the West more 
generally…Europe and the United States now have an opportunity to 
engage and anchor a resurgent Algeria as part of a new transatlantic 
approach to areas of shared interest on Europe’s periphery.83 
 
Consequences of the Civil War 
 
 
The most painful consequence of the Algerian Civil War is that over one hundred thousand 
people lost their lives during violence that took the form of assassinations, car bombings, 
village massacres, acts of vengeance, and military assaults.84 During the heat of the civil war, 
the FIS members were accused of committing terrorist attacks by the United Nations (UN). 
This accusation ostensibly paved the way for the notion of “fundamentalism”. It should be 
mentioned that notions of religious fundamentalism firstly emerged in 1920s by the 
Evangelical Church in the USA.85  The September 11 attacks took the notion one step further; 
however, since the focus of this dissertation is not to deal with the linkage of Algerian 
combatants with the Al-Qaeda militants, the issue will not be analyzed here.   
 
Although the regime was badly weakened when the civil war broke out, there was no military 
or administrative discontinuity, except for a brief moment in 1992: “Algeria was able to turn 
                                               
83
 Lesser, “Policy toward Algeria after a Decade of Isolation,” p. 21.  
84
 Silverstain, “The New Barbarians: Piracy and Terrorism on the North African Frontier,” p. 202.  
85
 For further research on religious fundamentalism you can look at, Donald Luidens’  “American 
Fundamentalism: Implications for US Policy.” Paper presented to the Arab Working Group for Muslim-
Christian Dialogue, Lebanon (June 2003).  
 
 56 
“structural adjustment” to its advantage and successfully repudiate its earlier commitment to 
socialist orientation. Algeria’s substantial oil resources provided a revenue base sufficient to 
reshape and enlarge its security forces to cope with GIA, AIS, and other Islamist militias.”86 
Since the consequences are relative, Young’s determinations can be disproved in terms of 
Insel’s criticisms elaborated during previous topics.   
 
Algerian international diplomatic policy during its civil war provides a framework to define 
its international relationships, and the results of those relationships despite domestic unrest.  
By 1990, the European Economic Community (EEC) and, later, the EU, developed a 
“Renovated Mediterranean Policy” to establish a partnership for the environmental and urban 
co-development of the region. Further, a “Horizon 2010” has been set for the creation of a 
“Euro-Mediterranean space” of free trade and regional economic and political integration.87 
Paralleling these arrangements, France initiated a “Mediterranean Forum” for political and 
cultural solidarity in the region. Under the aegis of this latter program, France has been able to 
maintain a privileged relation with its ex-colonies in the form of state visits, subsidies, and 
cultural exchanges.88 Nevertheless, underlining the IMF as an economic tool to end the civil 
war will be enlightening; however, one should pay attention to Silverstain who rightfully 
criticized the international organization as interest-seeking:   
  
It implies that the structures of neo-liberal globalization have tended to 
underwrite violence and not decrease it as some political science measures 
indicate. It implies that supranational organizations like the IMF are 
content to watch civil warfare continue as long as their debts are repaid and 
their taxes collected. It implies, furthermore, that the logical end game to 
                                               
86
 Young, “Deciphering Disorder in Africa: Is Identity the Key?,” p. 544.  
87
 Sami Naïr, “L’Europe à l’assaut commercial de la Méditerranée,” Le Monde, 4 October 1995. 
88
 Silverstain, “The New Barbarians: Piracy and Terrorism on the North Africa Frontier,” p. 194.  
 57 
the current violence is not the progressive democratization of the regime 
and the peaceful negotiation of conflict resolution but rather the imposition 
of external sovereignty, the reconstitution of a French (or American?) mare 
nostrum.89 
 
The main aim of Chapter II has been to show the reader that Algeria, which underwent a civil 
war for more than a decade, was broken politically and socio-culturally after it gained its 
independence.90 If massacres and economic dimensions are left behind, the migration has 
been one of the most significant consequences of the civil struggle. For some, Algeria had 
turned in to an insecure, unbearable country. The Algerians, sickened by ongoing violence 
and inertia in their homeland, chose to migrate to France as a solution. The following chapter 
will elaborate the details of this migration. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE ALGERIAN MIGRATION TO FRANCE: 
A LEGACY OF THE COLONIAL REGIME 
“No rights as a community, every right as individuals.”91 
                                                                                                                     Clermont Tonnerre 
 
Migration: An Oxymoron in Understanding French Society 
  
 
State policies, and how they govern migration, have always been a sensitive issue in most 
European countries. This relationship in France was a gangrenous one in the wake of the 
October 2005 Beur uprisings. France and its ex-colony, Algeria, ostensibly attempted to get 
rid of each other. But the effort was futile because they remain intertwined.  
 
The French policy of colonialism ended years ago, but its effects linger today from France to 
Maghreb. With a 150 year tapestry of interwoven history, these two countries share a 
relationship almost unknown to other countries around the globe. For better or for worse, 
France and the Maghreb are forever linked. Following an anecdote mentioned by Jean Daniel 
in his article, Dissident Algeria, will be helpful in describing the intertwined position of the 
two countries: “An Algerian singer/songwriter ‘brings the roof down’ when he ends his 
repertoire with the following remark: ‘Oh, you used to tell us that Algeria was France’; well, 
we have replied, ‘France is Algeria’.”92  This initial part of this chapter seeks to illuminate the 
pre-developments of the migration to France from Algeria -- its handicaps and consequent 
crisis.  
 
Immigration, the settlement of foreigners on French territory, dates back to the nineteenth 
century. At first, their demographic contribution to French society was positive because 
France benefited from the added workforce. After World War II, Algerian workers were 
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indispensable to the French economy in sectors like public contracting, foundries, and textiles. 
The Évian Agreements promised pieds-noirs93 their civil rights such as freedom on religion, 
language, and property. The Algerian workers living in France wanted the same rights as the 
French citizens had -- except for the political rights. A third wave of immigration started in 
1956 and rapidly swelled. By 1976, the number of immigrants had reached 3.7 million (7 
percent of the total population). Maillard’s comments on the issue are quite remarkable: “The 
economic slump of the mid-1970s put an end to the growth of legal immigration flows. For 
the first time, immigration posed to France as a nation a kind of colonial problem planted 
within itself, triggering strong political reactions that tended to overshadow complex 
phenomena of mutual repulsion.”94  
 
As mentioned above, France had the same need for labor other European countries needed 
immediately following World War II. From the middle of 1950s to the beginning of 1970s, 
France had become an attractive country for immigrants. In the aftermath of the Algerian 
independence war, an incursion of Algerians migrated to France to look for jobs and a new 
future. Peter Kivisto clarifies this process of migration to France: “By separating residence 
permits from work permits, the government opened the Gates to workers seeking employment 
and their families. This helped migrants view themselves not as temporary workers, but as 
permanent residents.”95 In spite of the ethnic quotas, the French government mostly preferred 
European immigrants rather than those coming from Africa and Asia. But, Algerians were the 
most numerous seeking to immigrate in those days. Portugal, Morocco, Italy, Spain, Tunisia 
and Turkey were the other countries that sent migrants to France for employment.  Today, 
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approximately four million Maghrebins inhabit France, making them a strong minority at 
approximately eight percent of the population. 
 
Retrospectively, French citizens living in Algeria, known as pieds noirs, were the first 
immigrants that returned to their homeland. Algerians known as harkis, who fought for the 
French army during the Algerian independence war, happened to follow. After the French 
defeat, most of its allies were executed by the Algerian nationalists; however, many of them 
escaped to the mainland.  Shortly after Algeria’s declaration of independence in 1962, France 
and Algeria signed a workforce agreement. This agreement concentrated the Algerian 
population in France in Paris, Lyon and Marseille.96 In 1974, the French government headed 
by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing ended the employment process of the migrants. The 
administration paid 10,000 Francs for the unemployed migrants and their families who 
voluntarily accepted to return home between 1971 and 1981. This compensation payment was 
essentially offered to persuade the North African immigrants to return their homelands; 
however, very few migrants went back. Those who returned to their home were basically 
Spanish and Portuguese immigrants. It can be clarified that according to the population 
statistics and through these measures, the population of the immigrants remained constant 
throughout the last quarter of the 20th century. Therefore, over four million Muslims live in 
France today according to the data below.  
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National Origins of the Muslim Population in France97 
Emigrants’ countries                                                Emigrants’ countries 
of origin                             Population                      of origin                             Population 
Algeria                               1,550,000                       Turkey                                 341,000 
Morocco                            1,000,000                       Converts                                 40,000 
Tunis                                    350,000                        Legal/Illegal refugees          350,000 
Central Africa                      250,000                        Asians                                  100,000 
Other                                    100,000 
Total                                                                                                                     4,181,000 
 
 
Having dealt with the causes of immigration in the wake of the Algerian war of independence, 
it will be beneficial to emphasize the impacts of the Algerian civil war on the migration 
process. The potential for a large-scale influx of refugees from the ongoing war in Algeria in 
1990s greatly concerned the French administration.  Ian O. Lesser pointed out, “From 1992 
onward, French observers in particular began to speculate about the risk of uncontrolled 
migration across the Mediterranean as French-speaking Algerians fled political violence and 
economic collapse.”98 Moreover, it was possible to speak about the potential spillover of the 
political violence and terrorist movements from Algeria to France. There was a spate of 
terrorist attacks linked to the GIA (Armed Islamic Group) in France throughout the civil war. 
The bombings were related to developments in Algeria, and were not a part of a terrorist 
agenda. Despite arguments that Algeria's problems have not spilled over and threatened the 
security of the west reflects the success of its policy of containment, rather than intervention, 
for the duration of the crisis. On the other hand, groups such as the armed wing of the FIS (the 
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Islamic Salvation Front) and the GIA (Armed Islamic Group) had established networks for 
fund raising, arms smuggling, and political advocacy in Europe.  
 
French politicians were worried about the possible radicalization and involvement of young 
Algerians, many of whom were alienated residents of poor suburbs. The spate of terrorist 
bombings in Paris connected to the GIA reportedly showed some connections with the GIA 
cadres and the fundamentalist aims. However, the reason behind much of the violence in 
France related to the Algerian war were mostly derived from factional struggles. And 
Algerians were the principal victims. It can be asserted that few Algerians in Europe appeared 
to want any part of the conflict taking place in their country. Nonetheless, it was the spillover 
of terrorism that emerged as the leading concern for Western policy makers. 
 
A wider consideration of France’s population will help to clarify the effects of immigrants on 
French society. According to the French High Council of Integration, France is home to four 
million to five million Muslims—defined by culture rather than religious observance—of 
whom up to half have French citizenship. Of the Muslim total, almost three million are of 
North African origin or ancestry, with 1.5 million from Algeria, one million from Morocco, 
and the rest from Tunisia. Of the other Muslims, Turks probably number about 350,000, sub-
Saharan Africans about 250,000, and assorted Middle Easterners (Iranians and Kurds, as well 
as Arabs) the remainder.99 It must be added that more than one-third of the immigrants have 
taken French citizenship.  
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French Policies of Migration and Citizenship: The Lack of Political Representation of 
Muslim Origin Migrants 
 
Policies on citizenship and migration have been hot discussions in France throughout the 
decades. This section will try to discuss the roots of migration problemas by dividing them 
into three topics: The affects of the principles of jus soli and jus sanguinis; the lack of political 
participation; and the dilapidation of immigration policies. France pursues the republican 
version of citizenship. It defined its prerequisite by jus soli. This principle refers to when an 
individual adopts republican ideals and replaces their local identity with the national identity. 
 
The French Republican ideal of race-blind nationalism has been a kind of cult for the 
distinction between the principles of jus soli and jus sanguinis.  The 1792 Decree provided 
French citizenship for foreigners who defended republican principles. It supplements the 
principle of jus sanguinis, which automatically provided citizenship for those having French 
parents. Revolutionaries attributed certain aspects for the jus soli principle that guaranteed 
loyalty to the French Republican ideals. Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel signify in their study, 
Euro-Turks – conducted in 2004-  that the principle of jus soli has not changed since the 
revolution.100 The 1851 Citizenship Code ceased to grant citizenship to third generation 
immigrants while arrangements applied in 1889 automatically provided citizenship for 
second-generation immigrants.101  
 
The speeches of Jean Marie Le Pen, the Leader of the National Front, re-visited the principles 
of jus soli during a paradoxical era. By that time, French laws had determined over the 
previous century that second generation immigrants were citizens. But extreme right groups in 
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France attacked the notion of jus soli during the 1980s. “Etre Français, cela se mérite,”102 
shouted Le Pen in a speech. Center right parties under the influence of the National Front, 
however, objected to automatic French citizenship. This issue was brought up during the 1986 
legislative year.  
 
According to the new legislation, second generation migrants would no longer obtain 
citizenship unless they gained the consent of the state. A commission was formed in the 
aftermath of the failure of Chirac’s attempts. This commission defended the expansion rather 
than the limitation of French citizenship rights. Moreover, the commission report shaped the 
foundation of the 93.933 Code adopted on 22 July 1993. Finally, through harsh discussions in 
the French parliament, the proposal was removed from the agenda. To sum up, despite the 
changes on these declarations, the requisition of French citizenship required five years of 
permanent residence, knowledge of the French language, assimilation into French society, a 
clean jail record for at least six months, and a criminal record devoid of crimes against the 
security of the state.  
 
On the other hand, a lack of political participation by minorities may be considered a major 
problem in France. It is clear that a lack of political participation or diverse representation of 
migrants or minority groups causes political frustration. Almost no Muslim has a seat in local 
and national parliaments. If efforts to adopt a quota law for parliamentary representation are 
abandoned; the failure of the French administration to rehabilitate political participation with 
better integration policies will inhibit social mobility. Therefore, Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
contribution, which is also referred in Kaya’s article, makes an eloquent sign in the minds. 
For MacIntyre, there are two modes of politics: Politics of the insiders and politics of the 
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outsiders. The insiders carry on their political practice via legitimate political institutions such 
as the parliament, political parties and the media; while the outsiders resort to culture, 
ethnicity, religion, and traditions to achieve their goals:  
 
It should be noted that marginal groups who cannot enter the political 
platform through legitimate political channels will sometimes use the 
language of religion, ethnicity, and sometimes of violence. The language 
used by Muslim atheists in France is, in this respect, the expression of such 
a political search. Many Muslims can find places in the French national 
team, the hip-hop culture, in cinema, plastic arts and many other fields, 
while having absolutely no place in the political arena. This imbalance must 
be corrected. From this perspective, the events in France are actions of 
immigrants seeking political recognition.103  
 
The paradox found in the struggle between migrants and the state can be explained by the 
politics of outsiders. Because of the lack of representation in the French local or general 
parliament, immigrants express their grievances via alternative channels. These channels will 
be more deeply elaborated in the following sections.  
 
There are multiethnic towns where whites are the minority; however, every elected 
representative is still white. The city of Tourcoing had only four or five North African town 
councilors in 2004 and yet the city led the nation in having the highest percentage of visible 
minorities among its population. Citizenship can seem less meaningful if citizens cannot 
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identify with their representatives. Therefore, people from both sexes, all classes, and all 
visible minority groups should have a chance to be elected. 
 
A study conducted by a famous poll institute, TNS Sofres, during a conference held by 
Sciences-Po on March 8, 2007, revealed French perceptions toward diversity in politics. 
When the participants were asked questions revolving around the “What it means to be 
French today?”, a significant majority confirmed that personal characteristics such as sex, age, 
and religion, would not influence their decision to elect a candidate, and more than two-thirds 
of the participants in the survey -- sixty-nine percent – think that parties and politicians poorly 
represent French people who are visible minorities or come from diverse backgrounds. It must 
be added that this opinion is quotidian for socialist sympathizers’, and tt ranks seventy-seven 
percent and in the middle and upper classes. These polls showed that many French people, 
seventy percent, think that an increase in political diversity will improve the lives of not only 
minorities, but, in fact, the whole country. The example of Sarkozy’s cabinet, on the other 
hand, is an improvement when compared with the past administrations. And it will enrich the 
ongoing argument here. Clémentine Dardy and David Bradley make a good point in their 
mutual study by claiming that the diversity of the Sarkozy cabinet has a long way to go. 
Sarkozy’s authoritarian management style has a significant impetus to feed the mentioned 
argument:  
 
Out of 33 heads of cabinet, only three are from visible minorities: Rachida 
Dati, Fadela Amara, and Rama Yade. Louis-Georges Tin, founder of black 
rights group Le CRAN, contests how much power Dati, Amara, and Yade 
will have…Rama Yade and Fadela Amara, the Secretary of State for Urban 
Policies in the current government of French Prime Minister François 
 67 
Fillon, “have no power,” Weil says. Yet Weil believes that Dati’s 
appointment as Minister of Justice “is a change.” Certainly having 
someone with an immigrant background sit as Minister of Justice is an 
“important move,” as Weil puts it. But that does not mean Dati will exercise 
power in the government.104  
 
Founder of LE CRAN, the Black Rights Group, Louis-Georges Tin emphasized in his study 
about the political representation of minorities that there has been a slight improvement in the 
diversity of the candidates engaged in political action. The study published in June 2007 
found that about twenty people for the Socialist Party (PS), and around thirty for the center-
right Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) were engaged. Dardy continues his rightful 
criticisms: “Of 3,777 candidates, 19 are black (0.5%). The PRG and the Green Party made 
important efforts in promoting diversity within their own system. Unfortunately, their 
following is too small to have a significant influence.”105 According to LE CRAN, 2.5% of 
the French population is black, yet only 0.5% of recently nominated National Assembly 
candidates were black. If these statistics are correct, they add more weight to an already 
substantial body of evidence that France’s political parties consistently dismiss minorities.  
 
It might be time to speak about the possible solutions for the problems deriving from the 
political participation in France. It must be asserted that there is not a panacea for the solution; 
however, there are significant attempts on the way. The cultural autonomy granted to Corsica, 
the election of two Muslim members to the European Parliament, the establishment of the 
Islamic Council of France in 2003 and the Union of Public Movement (UMP) government are 
important indications that the French Republic is becoming more democratized. Moreover, 
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the initiatives of the 21st Century Club may be considered an initial pillar for the solution. The 
21st Century Club proposed to the UMP and the PS a Political Diversity Charter in January 
2007 -- a document which aims to pressure political parties into nominating and appointing 
more minority candidates. Whether it has been effective or not is still blurred. The charter is 
unlikely to have had any direct impact, since it puts no binding restrictions on political parties, 
even if it is signed:  
 
The charter indicates that whites and elites, rather than just working-class 
minorities, feel that French discrimination is a problem which must be dealt 
with. And there is no indication that requirements or repercussions will 
eliminate discrimination in the political sphere. Indeed, it would be quite 
undemocratic if citizens had to in part choose their representatives based on 
race, gender, ethnicity, or any other measure. Further there is no evidence 
that instituting quotas or any other firm measure will change the heart of 
French prejudice.106  
 
The immigration policy in France has been another pillar that shaped the relations between 
the migrants and the government. The November 1945 Decree that formalized the major 
principles of immigration proposed that the migrations of the Algerian workers to France 
should take place within the framework of special provisions. Moreover, due to those special 
provisions, Algerian Muslims were allowed to circulate freely between France and Algeria. 
Dominique Maillard exemplifies those days: “Since they already held French citizenship by 
assimilation once they were in France, they did not need to apply for citizenship. The 
exceptional arrangement for the Algerian Muslim French was justified by the “blood debt” of 
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France toward the Algerians in two world wars.”107 The famous speech of General de Gaulle 
in 3 October 1958 eased social considerations to come back. The French General referred to 
the concept that the people of Algeria were “full-fledged Frenchmen.” Some demographic 
determined below will help to understand the French immigration policy in 1950s and 1960s. 
 
 About 14,000 single workers and 1,800 families from Algeria lived in the shantytowns of 
Lyons, Marseilles, or the Paris area; more than 130,000 people were considered as not having 
adequate housing and lived in overcrowded, furnished rental units.5 Housing had become a 
crucial issue for the Algerians migrating to France. However, the authorities then had only the 
housing of single-male workers in mind. Family housing did not look like a priority, but the 
tensions in Algeria in the 1950s had triggered a migration of families, rising from three 
thousand to twenty thousand between 1953 and 1960. 
 
Due to the oil crisis in the early 1970s, France’s economy suffered a downturn and slipped 
into a recession. One may claim that the oil crisis influenced the social welfare of the 
immigrants. That precipitated political concerns over immigration policy. The return laws 
along with illegal immigration remained disputes. Moreover, while labor migration almost 
stopped and the level of immigration started to decrease; return laws could not accomplish 
their purpose. Nevertheless, Maillard’s three considerations about the immigration policy are 
quite remarkable:  
 
France’s immigration policy has been at the crossroads of three 
considerations: 
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1. First is a logic of values, of political principles that distinguishes among 
political asylum, labor migration, and population immigration, and 
guarantees residence to the immigrant. 
2. Second is a logic of demographic politics, based on the principle that 
France needs population to remain or become again a world power. Young 
people likely to start families or with young families are welcome. Their 
children, born in France or coming at an early age, will be raised and 
educated in France. Furthermore, some demographers differentiate among 
the ethnic groups that are more likely to be integrated—or assimilated— 
into French society. 
3. Third is an economic logic, which is looking for male, single, flexible, 
usually low-paid workers—preferably in good health—who can adapt to the 
contradictory needs of the various economic sectors.108 
 
The current French President Nicolas Sarkozy was the Minister of Interior during the Beur 
uprisings in 2005. He makes a startling analysis in his book, İtiraflarım,109wherein he states 
that the districts need new arrangements for their immigrants. Whether sincere or not, 
Sarkozy’s analyses have a share of veracity: “Our districts especially need new arrangements 
for the immigration. Without the fulfillment of this precondition, nothing will be possible. This 
is a reality, although it is disturbing: Many problems in banlieus are the results of 
uncontrolled immigration, which failed integration, therefore. The offsprings of the first 
generation migrants feel less French than their parents and grandparents; however, they are 
legally more French than their ancestors.”110  
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Assimilation versus Integration 
Societies learn to discriminate during the process of socialization; migrants are typical victims 
of this process. One in ten residents in the Western European nations is a migrant and is 
inherently different than the majority in terms of culture. Migrants living in Western Europe 
face monumental structural problems. Because of the de-industrialization process in Europe 
that has taken place over the last two decades, immigrants to those countries face problems 
like unemployment, poverty and racism. The case in France is not an exception. The notions 
of assimilation, discrimination and integration have been issues within the homes of European 
families for centuries. Many of the more significant problems have strong ties with the past. 
The heavy burdens of today are linked with a strong chain to the colonization process in the 
past. The memories of humiliation at the hands of the French during colonization, followed by 
the atrocities of the Algerian civil war, still weigh on the conscious of Algerian migrants to 
France, as well as their posterity. Every Algerian has a brother or a relative who lives—or has 
lived—in France, which enables him to have access to a foreign market, with all of its goods 
and services. To the contrary, every Algerian who lives in the Hexagon has parents or 
relatives who voted for the FIS in 1990 or 1991. “Facing the contrary interpretations of these 
two worlds, what did the diabolical presentation of France mean for the Algerian citizens 
living in Algeria, the Algerian immigrants to France, and the naturalized French of Algerian 
origin and their French-born children in their daily lives and in the long-term?” Maillard 
asks.111  
Many reasons created structural problems for the immigrants. Unemployment, poverty and 
racism are some of the major ones. Kaya posits that the root of these problems were political 
and economic. These sentences will be quite helpful to understand the relationship between 
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the notions of assimilation, and discrimination on one side; and economic and political affairs 
on the other: 
This mode of relationship has created tension over the centuries, leading to 
the intimidation, annihilation or assimilation of some neighbors. Such 
tension has generally existed during eras of sociopolitical or socioeconomic 
structural problems. We know that peaceful coexistence can prevail during 
times of wealth. However, during times of political, legal and economic 
crises, we have borne witness too many accounts where our "next door 
neighbors" have been subject to exclusion, isolation or minorization 
mechanisms to become "the Others" and "the enemies within".112 
 
The process of industrialization and rising inequality in education resulted in alienation for 
immigrants involved in the Republican Project of “liberty, equality, fraternity”. Asserting that 
religion, ethnicity, language and tradition have been the only values to which they could 
identify themselves is a righteous argument. Muslims living in the banlieus of large cities 
attend their isolated schools, pray at their mosques, shop at their isolated stores and develop 
their own marginal economy, Kaya says. For him, “In an age when industrial production is in 
rapid descent, these people cannot adapt to the changing economy, fall into a state of 
constant exclusion and loneliness.”113 This idea advances the idea of parallel societies 
concomitant to the notion of “hyper-isolation”. Kaya’s argues that the existence of structural 
problems such as unemployment stemming from de-industrialization, as well as racism, are 
what lie behind the formation of parallel societies. This has largely been ignored:   
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Conservative political elites like Nicolas Sarkozy, who only aim at getting 
votes, indulge in deliberate misreadings, which result in the notion that 
immigrants are "enemies within" who must be eliminated. Given the 
problematic representation of immigrants and Muslims in the media, the 
issue runs into a dead-end. When all misinterpretations and misevaluations 
add up, it is easy to see how smoothly "neighbors next door" can be turned 
into "enemies within".114  
 
It is now obvious that there is a concrete asymmetry in the French society. This asymmetry 
leads to assimilation and discrimination, and obstructs the integration of migrants. “France is 
all the French,” said General de Gaulle in a speech; however, he forgot that some among the 
French are Muslim. And most of those Muslims are immigrants, or the French born second 
generation children of immigrants. Alec Hargreaves makes a remarkable distinction between 
the first and last generations of the immigrants:  
 
The virtual invisibility of former generations of immigrants and their 
children as well as grandchildren is perceived as the evidence of their 
successful integration. It is felt that post-war migrants and especially the 
migrants of last two decades threaten this tradition. It has become a 
common claim that it is harder to integrate migrants from the Third World 
as opposed to those from Europe. Instead of dissolving within the society 
without a trace, they are becoming more visible in an era when consecutive 
governments claim that “migration is over”. What is frightening is that 
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migration is beginning to create permanent and diverse minorities within 
the French society.”115  
 
The unemployed masses that are now becoming progressively poorer are simultaneously 
becoming more visible in the Paris suburbs. Although some of the unemployed immigrants 
benefit from the social welfare system, many are excluded from the social security system 
because of their chronic unemployment. Due to these facts, it is important to once again 
emphasize that unemployment among the émigré population still increasing.  
 
In addition to the negative affects of unemployment in French society, the failure of the 
national education system is another hurdle that immigrants face in the public sphere. 
Discrimination in the education system should influence French governors to formulate a 
fresh package of reforms for the integration of migrant youngsters into French society. 
Tribalat, who defines French society as a “Melting Pot”, emphasizes that discrimination 
toward the migrants causes an inconsistency between France’s republican ideals and the 
reality of the its society. He also asserts that, until recently, speaking about discrimination was 
a taboo because it was a threat to republicanism. The following words reveal the psychology 
of an immigrant student: “If I am to meet with discrimination, what is the point of working 
hard for success in school?"116 The argument made by the Sociologist Francois Dubet also 
unveils the discrimination in the educational era:  
 
Relations in schools, much like relations in society as a whole, are 
becoming increasingly racialist. Individuals are perceived and branded as 
people with "ethnic identities". To put it simply, whereas schools would 
define some students as working-class children in the past, now they define 
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them as children of emigrants. While a child's problems would be attributed 
to his/her father's poverty in the past, now they are being attributed to the 
fact that his/her father is a migrant, even though the child belongs to the 
third generation. The behavior of male children would be described as 
"hostile" in the past; now the behavior itself is being described as 
"ethnic".117 
 
Discrimination in the education arena has become more apparent with the headscarf issue in 
France. The issue came to a head with a report in the French press on 5 October 1989 that 
three students wearing the Muslim headscarf had not been accepted at Gabriel Havez Middle 
School in the city of Creil. One can claim that the headscarf issue highlighted the tension 
between Muslim migrants and the French state, as well as the issue of secularism in the 
French state. Tahar Ben Jelloun makes a remarkable opening on the gender discrimination 
within the Algerian community that cannot be separated from the issue of headscarf: “Only 
four percent of the children of immigrants get to university, compared with twenty-five 
percent of their native contemporaries.18 Moreover, a French-born and French-educated 
Abdel-Karim or Samira may not get the same career opportunities as a Jean-Pierre or a 
Marianne.”118 This chapter, however, will not detail this issue because the related discussions 
on it may become a topic of another thesis. 
Certain snapshots played a crucial role within the French society. These may be listed under 
the topic of religious inclinations of the migrants and minorities in France. It must be 
emphasized that after the September 11 attacks, many things changed in the countries that are 
home for Muslim minorities. Not to widen the topic, the consequences of the al-Qaeda attacks 
will not be discussed here; however, it must be asserted that al-Qaeda’s understanding of jihad 
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not only harmed the Muslim minorities living in the European countries along with the United 
States, it also re-invigorated xenophobia in the Western countries.  
When looking at the case of France in retrospect, it is apparent that some Muslim youngsters 
had chosen a more fundamentalist view of Islam under the influence of the Islamic Salvation 
Front (FIS). Hargreaves focuses on the recent studies conducted in France emphasizing that 
young Muslims hold their Islamic identity only at a symbolic level, that most do not observe 
religious rites such as daily prayers and fasting (during the month of Ramadan), and that they 
adopt an increasingly secular (material) worldview.119 Nevertheless, according to the works of 
Hargreaves and Taibalat, some young Northern Africans in France, Beurs, see themselves as 
“Atheist Muslims”.120  
Structural problems such as poverty, unemployment, racism, xenophobia, isolation, 
constraints in political representation and the threat of assimilation cause an increase in 
religious values. To overcome these problems, a new discourse on culture, identity, religion, 
ethnicity, traditions and the past is urgently required to appease immigrants in France. 
Without realizing the significance of religion and cultural values within the migrants, it seems 
impossible to cope with the problems. The following passage gives a clue on how to 
understand the role of religion within the immigrant demographic:  
 
Religion is an important cultural source for the development of identity 
among the Diaspora. However, religion no longer has an essentialist but 
rather a symbolic meaning for the third and later generations of the 
Diaspora. The significance of religion for youth lies in the fact that these 
young people are perceived in a prejudiced manner by the majority. The 
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majority uses Islam as the main reference point when defining young people 
from North Africa, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Morocco, Tunisia, or Turkey. For 
example, young adults of North or Central African origin, who are defined 
as Islamic by the general French public, believe that their identities are 
recognized with prejudice. As a reaction, they show increasing symbolic 
loyalty to religion.121  
 
Many research studies conducted in France conclude that a significant portion of the French 
population believes that discrimination exists and that it should end. For instance, La 
HALDE, the High Authority for the Fight against Discrimination and for Equality argues that 
affirmative action is too drastic a measure; therefore, other initiatives, including the Political 
Diversity Charter, should be implemented to cope with problems stemming from the 
assimilation policies of the French government. Moreover, there is a growing public 
awareness about the reality of discrimination. French society has great difficulty talking about 
the differences upon which such discrimination is based—in terms of sex, religion, and skin 
color. France has to learn how to speak about differences in its own way. Indeed, 
discrimination against ethnic minorities overwhelms the republican national framework and 
creates tension not only in the socio-economic field—for housing, for job applications, and so 
on—but in political representation as well. 
 
The argument that the French model for integrating immigrants is unsustainable has merit. 
Many scholars believe that France is an unsuccessful example of integration. Baudrillard is 
one of those who criticize the French model of integration harshly. “If we are talking about in 
the name of France that has no definition for its integration policies, this is only the reflection 
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of their own integration dreams that French people hopelessly made up,” says Baudrillard in 
his article. The following passage entirely shows the level of his exegesis on the integration of 
the migrants:  
 
While the immigrants are virtually out of circle, we face a deep crisis 
because of lack of heritage and insufficient identity. Immigration and its 
consequences are the symptoms of the struggle of our dissolving society 
with himself. In other words, the social problem in the shape of immigration 
clearly shows the exile that Europeans encounter within their own society. 
What is unacceptable is that we even could not integrate our own values. 
Nevertheless, we offer and insist those values to the immigrants, since we 
failed to accept and defend those values, whether they want or not. Indeed, 
we are not in the case of making any suggestions about integration so far.122  
 
The Beur Uprising:  The Bell Tolls for France 
 
The discrimination against, and belittlement of, migrants marginalized them within French 
society. Immigrants – especially those came from North Africa who faced policies of 
assimilation due to their difference in color, names and religion – preferred to live in the 
suburban areas, especially banlieues. This is the place to where French society marginalized 
them. Furthermore, the Islamic Diaspora, which used to be politically underrepresented and 
were perceived as a threat to the national and social security, formed parallel societies in 
France, as previously mentioned. It can be claimed that the parallel societies established in the 
Western countries are a kind of reaction to the structural and political mechanisms of 
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exclusion. “In other words, religiosity is too important to be limited to the beliefs of the said 
minorities, because what lies beneath religiosities are the structural problems of racism, 
xenophobia, poverty and unemployment,” Kaya says in his article.123  
 
The humiliation that immigrant children felt nourished their anarchist tendencies. The 
uprisings during the 1980s expressed the demands of life in the banlieues. The beurs wanted 
help from the French state for integration into the civil society through the redistribution of 
goods and services. But the French state does not define itself according to minorities. Power 
comes from the citizens, whose atomistic individualities form the nation; the French republic 
is the gathering of the citizens, not the gathering of the communities. The 1980 uprisings may 
be defined as a milestone for the immigrants in French society who made their voices known 
to the French political elite. What Dardy and Bradley emphasize in the following passage 
points to the significance of the 1980s riots: 
 
As a matter of fact, France’s face is multi-colored—it’s the face of a Black-
Blanc-Beur society that has difficulty accepting itself and whose growing 
violence underlines a deep malaise. Since the 1980s, this violence has been 
fueled in particular by the successive uprisings of the young coming from 
the banlieues. These young people have advocated for their right to exist 
within French society and have denounced their marginalization within that 
society. Such concerns make us question what it means to be French.124 
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As a matter of fact, the Beur uprising that broke in 2005 was not an un-expected occurrence. 
Director Mathieu Kassowitz even tried to attract the attention of the third generation youth 
across the world in his film, La Haine.125 Kaya’s elaborations about the movie are quite 
enlightening: “This cult film brought an acute and uninhibited perspective on the daily lives 
of the Muslim and Jewish youth living in the suburbs of Paris. It disclosed the isolation, 
loneliness, and hopelessness of these young people as well as the problems of education, 
employment, and xenophobia they face, and made an accurate depiction of the protest culture 
(rap, graffiti, break-dance, hip-hop) they produce. Kassowitz underlined that especially the 
Northern African youth (beurs) found their salvation in militant Islamic movements and in 
street gangs.” 126 The film, shot in 1996, showed a whole day of three young boys, Said, 
Hubert and Horbinne, who were unemployed and hopeless for their future. They may not be 
bad guys; however, their ethnic group and cultural belongings presented them as potential 
criminals. Thus, Kassowitz  tried to illuminate the problems of the banlieue youth almost ten 
years before the 2005 uprisings and almost declared that the bells had already tolled for both 
the French administration and the third generation youth. Following cue of a ten-year-old boy 
leaves a striking impression in the audiences’ conscious:  
 
Did you watch the news in the afternoon? They call us vagabonds. They say 
we will never mend our ways and the best thing is to send the immigrants 
like us away from this country. They also say they do not have any other 
remedy. For them, we are the source of mess. They provoke the public 
opinion against us. This is an inhuman thing. I am sure they will do 
whatever they can to expel us. They always show our bad habits on TV. We 
should take some precautions for their attitudes. Perhaps, we should also 
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attend a TV program. We can voice our problems in a legal way. For me, 
this is the best method. We cannot overcome anything with illegal 
methods.127 
 
The Beur uprisings of 2005 had always simmered beneath the surface of the minority diaspora 
in France. When two young North African men were electrocuted while trying to hide from 
the Paris police in a power transformer, nobody anticipated that millions of young Muslims, 
most of them North Africans, would rush to the streets in protestation. They were not only 
protesting the Paris police and the French government, they were also protesting the colonial 
rule and the Algerian civil war that caused that much pain and forced them to live in a foreign 
country that showed no intention to sincerely integrate them. Kaya’s diagnosis on the uprising 
underlines the subconscious of the Beur youngsters that became apparent in the aftermath of 
the demonstrations:  
 
The recent uprising in suburban Paris expresses the reaction of North 
African Muslim youth to unemployment, poverty, lack of education, 
inequality, racism, xenophobia, assimilation, loneliness, isolation, and 
exclusion….The attempt to construct a "politically equal citizen" has 
manifested itself as the citizen who has not fully achieved political rights. 
The fact that there is not one Muslim representative in the National 
Parliament of a nation that harbors nearly five million Muslim citizens, and 
that Muslim citizens are faced with similar representation issues in local 
councils has become the leading dilemma of the French Republic. This 
dilemma is the product of a misinterpretation of recent developments by the 
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French political elite, who have shut their eyes to differences and who been 
seduced by the myth that all French citizens are equal regardless of 
religion, language, race, ethnicity, class and gender.128  
 
The youngsters of the Islamic Diaspora in France reacted to the system in different ways. Rap 
music, graffiti, dance, looting and arson were some of the methods these unemployed third 
generation youngsters used to attract attention. It can be claimed that the Beur uprisings that 
erupted in 2005 was an eruption of the children of the migrants for being underestimated by 
the French political elite; however, the attitudes of the rulers raised that tension. The president 
of France Jacques Chirac implied that the uprising was the consequence of structural 
problems within France, which tacitly acknowledged the root of the riots. Meanwhile, the 
Secretary of Internal Affairs Nicolas Sarkozy, chose to describe the Muslim suburban youth 
with attributes such as "criminal", "vagabond", "ruffian" and "scum", demonstrating his effort 
to win the support of French public opinion. Baudrillard perceived the uprisings as a chance 
to overcome the gap between the Beurs and the French administration: “These incidents of 
uprisings unveil the disengagement in the society. At the same time it creates a conscious even 
it is insufficient. If our society intends to integrate those youngsters, then, it will exactly 
withdraw to exist for only itself. Let’s repeat: Along with the world-wide globalization, the 
French type discrimination is a small model of division which caused the emergence of two 
opposite worlds that will never reunite.”129  
 
Many criticisms were made in the wake of the uprisings in 2005. While some argued that the 
uprising was a result of social insanity, many scholars contended that most of the rioters were 
primarily victims of assimilation and discrimination. Some leftist groups also claimed that the 
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blame belonged to the French government because it did not pay any sufficient attention to 
and did not make enough investment in education and social improvement for the suburban 
areas. Nicolas Sarkozy, who is the former Minister of Interior and current French President, 
answers all these crises in his book, İtiraflarım.130 “These incidents caused a definite 
consciousness,” says Sarkozy by declaring that these events also played a precipitating role to 
write the mentioned book that has a special meaning for him.131 Sarkozy refutes the leftists 
who accuse him of increasing the tension in the bandies with his speeches and public 
statements. The former Interior Minister had called t he banlieue youth “vagabonds” and 
“ruffians”. Defending the French administration, Sarkozy puts forward an opening for a 
possible solution in banlieue crisis: “France has spent millions for banlieues as of 1980s. 
Tens of plans were implemented one after another. These efforts did not alter anything. 
Nevertheless, the situation went worse. What banlieues need is not money, but different 
methods and sincere discourses.”132  
 
The jury is still out as to whether the Beur incidents constituted an uprising or a riot, and, 
furthermore, whether the Beur incidents reached the peak pitch of excluded immigrant 
frustrations. The incidents that occurred in the suburbs of Paris during late 2005 seem to be 
the most recent expressions of those frustrations, and they might not be the last. Similar 
events, such as the burning of several hundred cars, attacks on public buildings, aggravation 
of social tension and the championing of Muslim identity have been frequent in France in the 
past two decades.  
 
This chapter will end with the remarks of Sarkozy over his understanding of a future France; 
however, the reader should determine for themselves whether these sentiments are sincere or 
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not: “I hate racism; however, I detest xenophobia. I believe in the power and richness of 
multiplicity. On the other hand, I blame those who condemn the French Republic into 
darkness, passivity and immobility; and those who deny the reality that our most modest 
citizens are in the center of increasing extremism.”133  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Colonialism was a process that affected five continents throughout its five hundred years of 
history. I find it quite useful to briefly re-explain here the very roots that pave the way for 
colonialism. Slavery was the only existing political and social system in agricultural societies 
all around the world in the Medieval and the following ages. But with the technological 
developments, the invention of gunpowder and typography, a new social class, a modern 
bourgeoisie, emerged in Europe. Inventions of gunpowder, typography and compass changed 
the world balances. These inventions were the evident of the precipitating ideology behind the 
colonialism. Thus, it can be claimed that aforementioned inventions were the concrete and 
supportive faces of the colonialism; however, they are not sufficient to elaborate the hidden 
ideology that will be dealt in the following passages. While typography paved the way for a 
revival in literature, gunpowder began to be used in wars and the compass in discovery of new 
lands. All these inventions served Europe to progress.  
 
Before the emergence of slave trade, bourgeoisie used to believe new energy sources should 
be discovered for they needed both labor force and new energy resources to process the 
material resources in their hands. This was what prompted adventurous European sailors to 
set the sail for unknown lands. Unlike imperialism, colonialism caused serious 
transformations in economies and cultures of societies it dominated. Still, arguing that 
colonization did not bring about imperialism would be a naïve approach since imperialism 
appeared as a natural outcome in all colonized societies. Although the idea of colonialist 
expansion initially stemmed from an ideal to make the world a more civilized and humanized 
place, its roots was concealed in Europe’s claim to be the only superior and unique 
civilization in terms of moral aspects. The result was cultural imperialism. A crystal clear 
example to cultural imperialism was France’s declaration of French as the official language in 
 86 
her colonies. Although the colonialist states led the economies of their colonies progress, they 
also paved the way for irrecoverable pains and hate in those societies.  
 
Today, it is impossible to ignore the very existence of many traumatic and oppressed societies 
that are products of a long-established colonial tradition, which was masked by Europe’s ideal 
to convert the world into a more civilized and more developed one. An analysis of the history 
of colonialism cannot be made without taking into account the slave trade, a big shame that 
marked the history. Unfortunately, the grandchildren of thousands of slaves abducted from the 
Dark Continent, Africa, to the European and the American continents to meet the labor force 
until the industrial revolution took place today do not have a respected place in societies they 
live in. Therefore, how rightful is it to expect grandsons of these races that experienced the 
bitterest historic traumas to integrate with societies they currently live in? The following 
anecdote Fanon tells in his book A Dying Colonialism is concrete evidence that the 
descendents of the colonized societies cannot have normal lives in the countries they 
migrated. Mrs. Christian Lilliestierna, the Swedish newspaperwoman, talked in a camp with 
some of the thousands of Algerian refugees. Here is an extract from her report:  
 
The next in the line was a boy of seven marked by deep wounds made by a 
steel wire with which he had been bound while French soldiers mistreated 
and killed his parents and his sisters. A lieutenant had forcefully kept the 
boy’s eyes open, so that he would see and remember this for a long time… 
This child was carried by his grandfather for five days and five nights 
before reaching the camp. The child said: “There is only one thing I want: 
to be able to cut a French soldier up into small pieces, tiny pieces!” 
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Does anyone think it is easy to make this child of seven forget both the 
murder of his family and his enormous vengeance? Is this orphaned child 
growing up in an apocalyptic atmosphere the sole message that French 
democracy will leave.134  
 
What has been told so far was about the problems that the history of colonialism paved the 
way in general. As a matter of fact, there is a huge corpus of literature on these problems. 
However, the main subject of this study is French colonization of Algeria and its outcomes 
that display different aspects colonialism. The only links France had with the Muslim world 
were the Crusades and Bonaparte’s expedition to Egypt. France and the Muslim world have 
always had significant cultural, political and commercial contacts especially through the 
Ottoman Empire. These links deepened with the colonization of Algeria and the other parts of 
Africa from 1830 onwards. The riots that took place in the suburbs of Paris in October 2005 
reminded us once again that the deep wounds caused by colonialism have not been recovered 
yet.  
 
As it is mentioned in detail in the first chapter, Algerians’ struggle for independence that 
started in Cebel al Aurés in 1954 ended in 1962, with the death of hundreds of thousands of 
people. This struggle for independence was, without a doubt, a resistance by Algerians against 
the inequalities and injustices they were subjected to in their own country. It is also not 
possible to make an analysis of the struggle for independence of the colonized societies, 
which was fuelled by the discourse of “national self-determination” following the First World 
War and furthered instigated following the Second World War, without making attributions to 
Europe’s phobia for expansion of the Soviet Communism. Following the Second World War 
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that erupted in 1939, the United States of America and the United Kingdom took control of 
Algeria because France was under Nazi occupation. This somehow saved Algeria from 
French yoke since the war against the Nazis in Europe had began to resonate in the deserts of 
Maghreb. The Bandung Conference in 1955 was a crucial step in putting an end to 
colonialism. Algerian society, fed up with assimilating French policies, pressures and 
oppression, raised the independence flag after the Evian Agreements in 1962. An eight-year 
bloody war finally ended the French colonization that started in 1830.  
 
Today, Algeria, the last North African country that won its independence, still carries the 
traces of the French colonization. Although that colonization ended years ago, its outcomes, 
namely the civil war and the accompanying migration in present day Algeria, bitterly reflect 
those traces. The People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria is the second biggest Arab-African 
country after Sudan. It is also the country where the world’s highest population growth rates 
take place. With the Constitution in 1996, Algeria defined itself as an Islamic, Arab, and 
Amazigh country. It underwent state-formation and nation-formation processes during 30 
years following the date it won its independence. But the eruption of the civil war clearly 
showed us that these two processes ended in failures. The Algerian Civil War that took place 
between 1991 and 2002 is analyzed in detail with references to its economic, political and 
religious dimensions in the second chapter of this thesis. The civil war in Algeria erupted 
when the 1990 general elections were cancelled following some concerns that the country 
would turn into a fundamentalist one. Following the success of FIS, an Islamic party, in the 
first tour of the 1992 elections, military took the power in Algeria. The Algerian Civil War is 
still cannot be discussed with all its dimensions simply because it is a quite recent event and 
normalization could not have fully occurred in the country. We see that studies on the civil 
war in Algeria are so few both in Algeria and in France. This is the reason why it is still a 
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topic of debate that whether the clashes in Algeria were a genuine civil war or a deep state 
fight. However, the evidences display very well the multiple dimensions of what has 
happened in Algeria. International observers comment that the clashes in Algeria that lasted 
more than 10 years underwent some evolution.  It might be argued that the clashes that started 
in the form of an insurgent-dominated struggle after the cancellation of the 1992 elections 
later turned into an urban terrorism. Some academics say the violence in the country has taken 
a more individualized and chaotic state and turned into clashes among vendettas, families and 
villagers.   
 
In this thesis, I mentioned about some international initiatives regarding Algeria’s foreign 
policy. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and the EU’s Barcelona Process are two of these 
initiatives. Although it is still debated whether these initiatives became successful or not, they 
definitely saved Algeria to become a fully inward-looking society. All in all, no initiatives 
could have prevented death of more than 100,000 people in Algeria as a result of several 
assassinations, car bombings, village massacres, acts of vengeance and military assaults. What 
happened in Algeria was a slaughter carried out by state or revenge of a nation, which could 
not save itself from the traumatic effects of colonization, from its own people? Was it the 
economic and political circumstances that dragged people into such a slaughter? Or was it a 
fight by deep state? Or was it simply the result of deep desperation?   
 
The Algerian Civil War that ended with a truce in 2002 has many economic, social and 
political aspects. Migration to France is one of them. Formerly, migration to that country was 
caused by economic reasons. But during the civil war and in the period that followed it, 
migration to France was seen as an alternative way for new chances. Throughout this study, I 
tried to analyze whether the immigrants in France are a part of the integration practice or not 
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and how much they were affected by the assimilating policies of the state. The following 
quote from Kymlicka is quite illuminating in interpreting the migration as a phenomenon in 
France: “Nation-states are composed of diverse ethno-cultural, socioeconomic, and linguistic 
groups due to the existence of internal minorities, or the settlement of new ones through 
immigration flows, asylum-seeking or border changes.”135  
 
In the final chapter, I tried to explain migration and citizenship policies of France and how 
these policies affected minority groups and immigrants politically and socially. As a result, it 
is possible to argue that about five million immigrants could not be integrated to the system 
since even the third generation members cannot describe themselves as genuine French. “Are 
we still living in the time when man must fight and die in order to have the right to be the 
citizen of a nation? Is anything more grotesque and humiliating and obscene than the 
appellation, ‘French-Moslems’?” asks Fanon.136  
 
Besides the serious unemployment levels among immigrants, discriminations they face in 
social and economic spheres pushed them to live in the suburbs.  Unless problems caused by 
discriminations and inequalities, and the crisis in suburbs are not solved, integration of 
immigrants, most of whom are the Maghrebians, to French society seems impossible. The 
headscarf issue and discussions on secularism in recent years also fuelled the debates on 
migration policies in France. Dominique Maillard’s comments in the following passage 
display the mentality of immigrants in France quite clearly: “Whatever the depth of their 
religious faith, they felt that the same secularists had not been so finicky when it came to 
tolerating the Jewish kippa and absenteeism on Saturdays or the display of Christian crosses 
dangling at the end of small chains. They suspected that behind the blaring opposition to 
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fundamentalism heralded by the secularists lay a less respectable xenophobic and racist 
purpose.”137 
 
Also, lack of political representation causes immigrants to politically express their existence 
and rights. Given all the said circumstances, the eruption of Beur Uprisings in October 2005 
was no surprise. The following two questions by Kaya are quite valuable in explaining that: 
“Is it really their cultural differences, their anti−integrationist, reactionary attitude, and their 
Islamic identity that considers fighting against Christianity a religious duty, which takes 
Muslims to the street? Or, are their mass−opposition and social movements the manifestation 
of a resistance against almost two centuries of colonialism, exclusion, racism, xenophobia, 
and the more recent conditions of poverty?”138 The Beur Uprisings were not the first 
resistance. Nor they will be the last one. However, it would be a too naïve and one-sided 
perspective to attribute the reasons of these uprisings to assimilating and discriminative 
policies of France against the Maghrebians within the last ten years. This thesis tries to 
provide a multi-dimensional social scientific analysis to the issue. Its main argument is that 
the Beur Uprisings are a legacy of colonization to France.  
 
In sum, this study argues that many events in history triggered each other. Thus, neither the 
history of colonization can be analyzed independently from the Algerian Civil war nor the 
latter can be grasped without attributions to migration policies of France and the problems of 
immigrants in that country. Chain of events that made up the subject of this thesis began with 
colonization and ended in the Beur Uprisings. But as a Chinese proverb says, “A long trip 
begins with a small step.” Therefore, this study tries to find a contributive place to itself in all 
these chain of events. 
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